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This paper uses micro-level data on mutual funds from different financial centers investing in equity
and bonds to study how investors and managers behave and transmit shocks across countries. The
paper finds that the volatility of mutual fund investments is driven quantitatively by both the underlying
investors and fund managers through (i) injections/redemptions into each fund and (ii) managerial
changes in country weights and cash. Both investors and managers respond to country returns and
crises and adjust their investments substantially, for example, generating large reallocations during
the global crisis. Their behavior tends to be pro-cyclical, reducing their exposure to countries during
bad times and increasing it when conditions improve. Managers actively change country weights over
time, although there is significant short-run pass-through from returns to these weights. Consequently,
capital flows from mutual funds do not seem to have a stabilizing role and expose countries in their














1.  Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 reignited the interest in the behavior of financial 
intermediaries in both propelling risk taking and propagating shocks across markets and 
countries. In fact, several papers argue that financial intermediaries were at the core of 
the global financial crisis, as well as in some of the previous crises in emerging 
economies. In particular, the literature stresses that market participants tend to take 
too much risk during good times, and run and retrench when shocks hit the financial 
system.
1 Countries and companies facing short-term or foreign currency debt, or simply 
depending on volatile foreign financing, are then susceptible to shocks and can become 
financially constrained as liquidity in the financial system dries up. 
In a world where most savings are intermediated, two types of market 
participants become essential to understand the behavior of financial institutions when 
investing domestically and globally: (i) the underlying investors delegating their assets 
to financial intermediaries and (ii) the managers allocating those assets. In the case of 
investments abroad, investors tend to channel the bulk of their assets through financial 
intermediaries dedicated to investing across countries, pouring funds into those 
institutions when they wish to diversify globally and withdrawing their funds when they 
favor local assets. Managers, in turn, need to deal with these shocks from investors and 
other shocks by deciding how much cash to accumulate and in which countries to 
                                                            
1 See Allen and Gale (2000, 2007), Chang and Velasco (2001), Cifuentes et al. (2005), Diamond and Rajan 
(2005), Rajan (2005), Calomiris (2008), Broner et al. (2010, 2011), Forbes and Warnock (2010), Milesi-
Ferretti and Tille (2010), and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011), among many others. 2 
 
invest. The shocks managers face can be large. For example, during the 1998 Russian 
crisis and the 2008-2009 global crisis, financial institutions faced severe liquidity 
shortages and withdrawals from the underlying investors, leading to the collapse of 
Long-Term Management Company (LTCM), Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers, and 
pushing the entire world financial system to the brink of a meltdown.  
The link between the underlying investors and fund managers, partly driven by 
limited information and principal-agent problems, is important because it can 
profoundly affect portfolio allocations by financial institutions. This link exists because 
managers are monitored by investors (and their own supervisors) and respond to the 
incentives that the monitoring imposes on them. The relation between managers and 
investors is perhaps more obvious in the case of demandable debt that affects banks and 
bond mutual funds (among others), where short-term rollover decisions by investors are 
strategic complements and condition managers that are involved in maturity 
transformation.
2 Bank runs are a good example of this since the incentives to run are 
correlated among depositors, given that their demandable claims (whose value is fixed in 
nominal terms) are returned on a first-come, first-served basis (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983). The maturity mismatch and the possibility of a run constitute a source of 
fragility as liquidity may suddenly vanish (Brunnermeier, 2009; Shin, 2009; Raddatz, 
2010; and Gorton and Metrick, 2011). Vulnerability can be exacerbated under the 
                                                            
2 More specifically, when one investor withdraws financing, banks and bond mutual funds are more likely 
to run into trouble. Thus, other things equal, other investors have more incentives to withdraw financing 
as well. In this sense, the decisions by investors are strategic complements (Bulow et al., 1985). 3 
 
presence of leverage, where margin calls can also trigger collapses.
3 But fragility can 
exist even in the case of demandable equity (characteristic of mutual funds), where the 
value of the claims move in tandem with the value of the assets so the rush to get out 
first is attenuated. For instance, if investors have asymmetric information and flows to 
mutual funds are related to past returns, sudden collapses in returns can generate fire 
sales by investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), which accentuate the collapse in returns 
resulting in further liquidations. This serial correlation of returns resulting from funds 
selling assets at distressed prices provides incentives for investors to sell their claims as 
soon as possible (before prices continue declining) and may result in run-like behavior. 
The fact that investors can pull out their demandable (debt or equity) claims can 
generate incentives for managers to avoid long-run arbitrage opportunities, herd, and 
deviate from the optimal portfolios for the underlying investors (Scharfstein and Stein, 
1990 and Stein, 2005, 2009). In the case of mutual funds, open-end structures allow 
investors to monitor managers on a short-term basis and discipline them if they behave 
badly, but this short-run monitoring can impose limits to arbitrage, as managers are 
constrained to take long-run positions. For example, managers might not buy assets at 
fire-sale prices during crises, which are likely to pay off in the long run, since they can 
suffer short-term withdrawals from the underlying investors. Agency problems might 
thus lead to short-term structures, vulnerability, fire sales by investors and managers, 
and contagion effects. 
                                                            
3 See, for example, Calvo (2002), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), Mendoza and Smith (2006), and Mendoza 
(2010). 4 
 
While the literature argues that the supply side of funds and, in particular, the 
actions of managers and investors are important in the transmission of shocks, detailed 
and direct evidence on how financial intermediaries behave in their international 
investments is rather limited. Some papers analyze the case of bank flows, whereas 
others study mutual fund flows across countries.
4 Although very informative about the 
behavior of institutional investors, these studies tend to focus on aggregate investment 
flows into different countries (using bank flows, foreign direct investment, and portfolio 
flows). Therefore, they mostly miss important micro aspects of the inner-workings of 
financial institutions, like how fund managers and the underlying investors behave, 
which seem essential to understand how financial intermediaries invest and react to 
shocks. These reactions seem to be at the core of the transmission of crises. Three 
exceptions that stand out and are good complements to this paper are Kaminsky et al. 
(2004), Hau and Rey (2008), and Jotikasthira et al. (2009).
5  
                                                            
4 See, for example, Borensztein and Gelos (2003), Martinez Peria et al. (2005), Broner et al. (2006), Hau 
and Rey (2006), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), and Fratzscher (2011).  
5 Kaminsky et al. (2004) study momentum trading by investors and managers of Latin American equity 
funds during the Asian crisis. Hau and Rey (2008) use data on equity funds to study whether foreign 
exchange and equity risk measures trigger rebalancing behavior at the fund and stock level. Jotikasthira 
et al. (2009) analyze how the movements in outside investor flows force significant changes in the fund 
portfolio allocations to emerging markets that drive emerging market equity returns, correlations among 
emerging markets, and the betas of emerging markets on developed markets. A much larger literature 
studies other aspects of the behavior of mutual funds, at the domestic or international level. See, for 
example, Grinblatt et al. (1995), Wermers (1999), and Gompers and Metrick (2001) for the U.S. domestic 
funds, and Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Kim and Wei (2002), Chan et al. 
(2005), Gelos and Wei (2005), and Didier et al. (2010) for the international ones. 5 
 
In this paper, we use a micro-level dataset on international mutual funds to shed 
new light on how investors and managers react to shocks and might help transmit them 
across countries. International mutual funds are particularly useful as they enable us to 
separately analyze: (i) injections/redemptions, driven by the underlying investors; (ii) 
fund portfolios or country weights, which are at the sole discretion of managers; and (iii) 
their interactions (how investors monitor managers).
6 The main data consist of portfolio 
weights and assets invested in each country around the world for 1,076 equity and bond 
mutual funds on a monthly basis during 15 years, January 1996 and November 2010. 
The data cover portfolio allocations to 124 developed and emerging markets and cash, 
plus fund returns, which allow us to obtain injections and redemptions into each fund.  
With the assembled dataset, we study the contribution of the underlying 
investors and managers to the transmission of shocks and crises, with special attention 
to the global financial crisis. We explore several related questions of interest. How 
volatile is the mutual fund investment across countries? Do mutual funds help transmit 
crises, as the literature has argued for financial intermediaries? What was their specific 
behavior during the global crisis? More generally, what is the role of investors and 
managers? How volatile are injections? To what extent do weights remain constant over 
time? To the extent that weights change, how much are they the cause of valuation 
effects versus actual buying/selling in different countries or regions? How long does it 
take for weights to adjust to shocks? How are cash positions used? Are there differences 
                                                            
6 Henceforth, we often use the term “injections” to refer to injections/redemptions, with the 
understanding that redemptions correspond to negative injections. 6 
 
between bond and equity funds? Lastly, how much of the volatility of capital flows is 
driven by the behavior of the underlying investors and how much by the behavior of 
mutual fund managers? Are capital flows and retrenchments largely driven by flows into 
and out of investment funds that lead them to liquidate positions across countries to 
maintain portfolio weights, or by active changes in these country weights by fund 
managers? 
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. Mutual fund assets 
fluctuate substantially and pro-cyclically over time. Both the underlying investors and 
managers are behind these movements, retrenching from countries in bad times and 
investing more in good times. In the case of the underlying investors, wealth effects 
(driven by shocks at home) seem to have a direct impact on how much they invest in 
other countries. When shocks are correlated across countries, like during the global 
crisis, they do not act as deep-pocket international investors buying assets abroad at 
fire-sale prices. The investor behavior exerts pressure on managers, who need to react to 
this pressure as well as to shocks to returns (or valuation effects). In the short run, 
managers allow shocks to returns to pass-through to country weights, with the latter 
changing substantially over time. Over the long run, weights deviate from the pass-
through effects. While during normal times managers do not allow the pass-through to 
be complete (in relative terms they reallocate a small fraction to countries that are 
doing badly), they behave pro-cyclically during crises, moving away from countries 
experiencing turmoil. This pro-cyclicality is observed particularly in equity funds. 7 
 
Managers of bond funds hold a larger cash cushion, which allows them to better absorb 
shocks. The behavior of managers and investors has a direct effect on capital flows to 
countries around the world. In sum, neither managers nor investors seem to be 
exploiting potential long-term arbitrage opportunities by being contrarian, especially 
during crises, and exerting a stabilizing role. Instead, they seem to amplify crises and 
transmit shocks across countries. The global crisis was a notable example of this type of 
behavior. 
Our findings are relevant to different strands of the theoretical literature in both 
international finance and finance. First, the results in this paper suggest that the 
demandability of assets plays an important role in the reactions of investors, and is a 
factor that cannot be neglected in future models of crises. We show that investors run 
even from equity claims, not just from debt claims. This could be explained, for 
example, by autocorrelation in returns or wealth effects coming from the investors’ 
home country. Moreover, a run by certain investors might trigger runs by other 
investors, perhaps because of asymmetric information or because flows are related to 
past returns.  
Second, the findings in this paper also contribute and provide evidence to the 
theoretical literature that discusses whether the open-end and closed-end structure of 
mutual funds matter. Our results from open-end funds indicate that when shocks are 
correlated across countries, like during the global crisis, managers do not act as deep-
pocket international investors buying assets abroad at fire-sale prices. The behavior of 8 
 
investors exerts pressure on managers. The evidence is, thus, consistent with the 
theoretical literature that argues that in open-end structures neither managers nor 
investors act counter-cyclically, trying to benefit from potential long-term arbitrage 
opportunities, and thus performing a stabilizing role. Instead, they seem to amplify 
crises and transmit shocks across countries, which is also consistent with the large 
contagion literature.
7  
Third, the findings also relate to the literature that discusses how different types 
of shocks trigger crises. There is an extensive literature on the origins and propagation 
of financial crises, and a growing literature on the global financial crisis that tries to 
understand why a relatively small shock in the U.S. subprime sector resulted in a global 
recession and the near collapse of many financial institutions and markets. Several 
papers in this literature conclude that financial institutions play an important channel 
of the transmission of shocks across countries, producing large fluctuations in capital 
flows.
8 In this paper, we show micro-evidence that suggests that shocks to the supply 
side of funds seem important in the transmission and amplification of shocks. With the 
data we use, we are able to measure different effects inside financial intermediaries, 
which other papers that focus on capital flows (aggregate or by type) cannot do, despite 
the increasing interest in financial intermediaries in the transmission of crises. In 
particular, we measure the shocks faced by managers investing internationally and the 
                                                            
7 See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Claessens and Forbes (2001), Boyer et al. (2006), and 
Mendoza and Quadrini (2010).  
8 See, for example, Shiller (2008), Eichengreen et al. (2009), Hellwig (2009), and Mishkin (2011). 9 
 
way they respond to those shocks. Namely, we disentangle the actions of investors 
injecting and withdrawing capital from open-ended funds, possibly as a way to discipline 
managers, and the behavior of managers actively allocating country portfolios and 
reacting to shocks from investors and returns. Our results support the claims that 
shocks to financial institutions and their inner-workings are important to understand 
crises.  
Fourth, there is an increasing interest in studying how portfolios are managed 
when investing around the world and how shocks impact them. Important among shocks 
are valuation effects.
9 One advantage of working with mutual fund data is that we can 
work with actual portfolios. This is helpful because, while there is much discussion on 
portfolio reallocations, there is limited information on how portfolios are allocated and 
managed. There are no data on the portfolios of households and little data on those of 
other institutions like banks and hedge funds. Moreover, unlike country portfolios, the 
data we use are not inferred from capital flow data. In our case, we link movements in 
asset allocations to capital flows by an important group of foreign portfolio investors, 
international mutual funds. Moreover, we analyze in detail what role valuation effects 
play in changes in portfolio compositions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the data 
and provides some basic statistics of the mutual fund investments across countries. 
Section 3 discusses the shocks to managers and studies the variation in fund allocations 
                                                            
9 See, for example, Broner et al. (2006), Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), Hau and Rey (2008), Krugman 
(2008), Devereux and Yetman (2010), and Gourinchas et al. (2010). 10 
 
(the manager’s decisions). Section 4 analyzes how managers and investors react to 
crises. Section 5 studies how the variations in the investor and manager responses affect 
capital flows to different countries. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and Summary Statistics 
In this paper, we use a micro-level dataset consisting of an unbalanced panel of 1,140 
international equity mutual funds and 121 international bond funds, containing the 
monthly country portfolios of these funds over the period December 1995 to November 
2010 for equity funds and July 2002 to November 2010 for bond funds. The dataset 
comes from EPFR Global and includes active and dead cross-regional and regional 
equity and bond funds registered in various domiciles globally. These funds invest in 
over 124 developed and developing economies around the world. For each fund and 
month, the dataset contains the total net asset (TNA) value of the fund denominated in 
U.S. dollars, the percentage of the fund assets allocated to each country (which we refer 
as country weights or weights), and the percentage held in cash. The dataset has actively 
and passively managed funds with different investment scopes: global, emerging markets 
and different regional funds (Table 1). The data also contain information on the fund 
domicile, the family (investment or asset management company), and main currency 
denomination.
10 We generally use the term “fund type” to refer to any of these 
dimensions of fund characteristics, clarifying the precise dimension when necessary. 
                                                            
10 Our sample covers mainly open-end mutual funds. While EPFR Global data contain some closed-end 
funds, their importance is relatively small. Moreover, many of the closed-end funds they cover allow for 11 
 
To perform the empirical analysis, we cleaned the original data in standard ways, 
reducing the sample in about 15% and the total of funds to 1,076 starting in 1996.
11 The 
final dataset on country allocations contains 7,429,000 observations of the investments 
of the included mutual funds across countries and time. There are substantially more 
data (cross sectional and time series) and variety of funds for equity funds than for 
bond funds. For this reason, we place somewhat more weight on the results using equity 
funds.
12  
We complement the analysis by collecting additional data from other sources 
aimed mainly at computing inflows and outflows to funds and countries. To calculate 
monthly injections into each fund, we collect data on fund prices (Net Asset Values, 
NAVs) from Bloomberg and Datastream that we match to the corresponding funds from 
EPFR Global by name and family. We are able to match about 90% of the funds in our 
cleaned sample, ending up with 896 and 106 equity and bond funds, respectively, with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
monthly or quarterly subscriptions and redemptions, and are therefore not truly closed. There is also flow 
activity due to share buybacks or distributions being taken in cash.  
11 We conducted two basic cleanings. First, we removed fund-time periods where the data was reported at 
a frequency other than monthly. This excludes some funds that report quarterly data during part of the 
sample period. Second, we excluded funds that report data for less than 12 months in the entire sample 
(unless they are present until the end of the sample period).  
12 Equity mutual funds cover the period January 1996 to November 2010 and contain nine types of funds 
(of global and regional nature). There are a total of 965 mutual funds with 6,867,500 usable observations. 
Instead, bond mutual funds cover the period July 2002 to November 2010, encompass two types of funds 
(global and global emerging markets), and include a total of 111 mutual funds. The total number of 
observations (country weights and cash) for bond funds is 561,500. 12 
 
return data.
13 The analyses in the paper that require fund return information are 
restricted to this subset of funds.  
Since we do not know the detailed portfolio of each fund within a country, we use 
country-level indexes to compute returns and assume throughout the paper that all 
funds investing in a country experience the same return to their investments in that 
country, disregarding country-return heterogeneity across funds.
14 To this end we collect 
monthly, dividend-adjusted price indexes in U.S. dollars for stock markets (MSCI 
Standard Index, S&P Broad Market Index, and local sources for a total of 86 countries) 
and bond markets (JP Morgan sovereign bond index for 78 countries).
15 Analyses that 
require country-return information are restricted to those countries and time-periods for 
which we could gather these data. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the cleaned mutual fund sample (without 
constraining by return price availability). Panel A reports sample characteristics by 
                                                            
13 Information on ISIN is not available for the EPFR Global mutual funds, so we had to match the return 
data with the EPFR Global data according to the mutual fund name and family, using an algorithm that 
compares the (Levenshtein) distance across names (which takes into account the minimum number of 
insertions, deletions, or substitutions necessary to change one string into the other). We then manually 
screen out incorrect matches and complete the matching process. This procedure yields 896 matches for 
equity funds and 106 matches for bond funds (over 90% of the sample). The total number of observations 
of fund prices is 255,510. 
14 We believe this is a reasonable approximation given the documented synchronicity of returns across 
assets within countries, especially in developing countries (Morck et al., 2000). Furthermore, we find a 
strong correlation between the return of a fund computed directly from its NAV and the return computed 
from the portfolio of country investments and country-level returns, which gives additional validity to our 
approximation. 
15 The time coverage is January 1999-November 2010 for stock market indexes and July 2002-November 
2010 for bond market indexes. The total number of observations of stock and bond market indexes across 
countries and over time is 23,272. 13 
 
equity/bond funds. There are 965 equity funds (85% of the entire original sample) from 
January 1996 to November 2010, with a median number of 47 observations per fund. 
The total number of bond funds is 111 (92% of the entire original sample), covering the 
period July 2002 to November 2010, with a median number of 34 observations per fund. 
Panel B reports the number of funds and observations by different partitions. Of the 
total sample, 95% is actively managed and the rest is passively managed. Also, almost 
65% of the funds have their investment scope in Asia (excluding Japan), global markets, 
global emerging markets, or Europe. Finally, Table 1 documents the number of funds 
and observations by domicile. The funds are primarily domiciled in developed market 
jurisdictions, in fact, 80% of the funds are domiciled (in order of importance by the 
number of funds) in Luxembourg, the U.S., the U.K., and Ireland. Appendix Table 1 
classifies funds by mutual fund family. Average total net assets (first computed within 
funds, and then across all funds) is around 620 million U.S. dollars for both equity and 
bond funds. Appendix 1 provides more description of the data and some investment 
patterns. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of total net assets (TNAs) in equity and bond funds 
by region. Panel A plots total assets for equity funds between January 1996 and 
December 2000 and between June 2001 and November 2010.
16 Panel B displays total 
assets for bond funds between July 2002 and November 2010. The figure shows not only 
                                                            
16 The division between both time frames in equity funds is an important one due to the relevance of 
global equity funds. EPFR Global starts reporting information for global equity funds in June 2001. The 
introduction of this type of funds adds nearly 90,000 million U.S. dollars to the total assets in all equity 
funds.  14 
 
the large increase in total assets over time, but also the sharp declines around crises, 
particularly around the Asian and Russian crises and the global financial crisis. A 
similar pattern is observed for bond funds. The figure also shows that, as a group, bond 
funds are much smaller than equity funds (100 versus 599 billion U.S. dollars in 
November 2010), even though the mean fund is of a similar size. 
It is interesting to observe not only the variation in TNAs but also that of 
country weights, for which we focus on the period around the global financial crisis. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the weights for equity and bond funds, respectively, with global 
funds at the top and global emerging funds at the bottom. The figures illustrate the 
evolution of weights for some of the main regions of investment within emerging and 
developed countries. In particular, they show the weights in: (i) emerging economies 
(emerging Asia, emerging Europe, and Latin America), developed Europe, and North 
America for global funds and (ii) emerging Asia, emerging Europe, and Latin America 
for global emerging funds. The figures also mark some of the main events around the 
global crisis: the nationalization of Northern Rock, the collapses of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers, and the AIG near-collapse. 
Figures 2 and 3 show several noteworthy features of the data. First, weights 
fluctuate substantially over time. Second, there are significant reallocations across 
regions especially at times of stress. For example, the figures for equity funds show that, 
even though the epicenter of the crisis was in the U.S., managers started liquidating 
their exposure to emerging economies after the collapse of Bears Stearns while they 15 
 
increased their exposure to North America. This is consistent with a relatively smaller 
collapse in some asset prices in the U.S. than, for instance, in emerging Asia. Only in 
early 2009 managers started reversing that trend. Among global emerging funds, 
managers sold their positions in emerging Europe and Latin America and moved to 
emerging Asia. For example, between June 2008 and July 2009 the mutual fund 
exposure in Asia increased from 45% to 55%, while it decreased from 14% to 9% in 
emerging Europe (after having dropped to 7%) and from 24% to 21% in Latin America. 
Among bond funds, the large substitution took place between developed Europe and 
North America in global funds, when managers reduced their exposure to Europe from 
51% in March 2008 to 31% in November 2008 and increased their share in North 
America from 7% to 19% during the same period. Global emerging funds sold their 
positions in emerging Europe and bought assets in emerging Asia after August 2008.  
Figure 4 shows a similar plot but for cash positions, which increased for equity 
funds in the buildup to the crisis and started declining sometime after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Bond funds show more variation in their cash positions before the 
crisis, with global bond funds reducing their holdings and global emerging bond funds 
increasing them. Nonetheless, bond funds quickly reduced their cash positions after the 
collapse of Lehman. 
 16 
 
3.  Shocks to Managers and Portfolio Reallocations  
Mutual fund managers decide on the allocation of the funds they manage, but the size of 
these funds depends on the returns of their previous investments and the injection 
(redemptions) of flows into (out of) the fund. While the return of a fund depends on its 
past investments, the exact realization of the return is stochastic and can be considered 
as a shock to the fund manager. Similarly, while the performance of a fund may affect 
its injections and redemptions, ex-post these inflows and outflows are at the discretion 
of the underlying investors and largely outside the control of managers. 
Mutual fund assets fluctuate importantly. The median growth rate of assets 
across equity funds fluctuates between -30% and 20%, with a time average of 0.35% and 
a standard deviation of 7.44% (Figure 5). Fluctuations in the median growth rate of 
assets are somewhat smaller among bond funds, moving between -20% and 10% (time 
average and standard deviation of 1.09% and 3.70%, respectively). Table 2 shows 
interesting variation in the growth rate of assets of funds specialized in different 
regions/segments. Among equity funds, those specialized in the group called emerging 
Europe, Middle East, and Africa and in that called emerging Europe experience the 
highest growth in assets and the highest variability of this growth. On the contrary, 
funds specialized in Europe experience the lowest growth rate of assets. Similarly, 
among bond funds the highest growth rates (and highest standard deviations) occur for 
global emerging funds. Thus, at the TNA level, the data show a shift in favor of 
developing countries during the period of analysis. The evolution of the median growth 17 
 
of assets of mutual funds is characterized by lengthy periods of expansion followed by 
shorter periods of sharp contractions that roughly coincide with periods of international 
financial turmoil. For instance, equity fund assets experienced large declines in 1997-
1998, 2001, and 2008. Because of sample restrictions, among bond funds we only observe 
the drop in assets in 2008. 
Fund assets may grow because of higher returns of their investments or because 
of injections to the fund by the underlying investors. In fact, the growth rate of fund  ’s 
total assets,      , can be trivially written as 
                  ,  (1) 
where     is the (net) return to fund   at time  , and           /      is the injection to 
the fund       expressed as a fraction of the fund’s initial assets        . While injections 
are not directly observable, we can estimate them. To do so, we compute individual 
fund returns on a given month and obtain injections from the difference between the 
change in total net assets and individual returns. More formally, 
                    ,  (2) 
where     is the gross rate of returns to fund   at time  , computed as           ⁄ , with     
being the fund price or NAV, adjusted by dividend payments.
17 
                                                            
17 A fund’s net asset value (NAV) corresponds to the total net assets (     divided by the number of 
shares (   ). Thus, the ratio of NAV in two consecutive periods correspond to the ratio of the total asset 
values times the inverse ratio of total shares               ⁄              /           . The flows into the 
fund can also be expressed as the increase (decrease) in shares times the value of the share      
                            ⁄ . Replacing this in Equation (2), we obtain that the gross returns correspond to 
the ratio of net asset values. The only caveat to our calculation is that total net assets discount the value 
of a fund’s liabilities, such as the fees paid to the managers. However, if these fees are proportional to the 18 
 
The evolution of the returns and injections for the median fund is shown in 
Figure 5, Panels B and C, while summary statistics are reported in Table 2. For the 
median equity and bond funds, both returns and injections experience significant 
fluctuations. Fluctuations in fund returns are much more volatile than those in 
injections for equity funds (standard deviations of 6.23% and 2.05%, respectively), while 
for bond funds the volatility of these components is similar (standard deviations of 
2.53% and 2.05%, respectively). This is consistent with equity returns being more 
volatile than those of fixed income securities (Schwert, 1989; Andersen et al., 2007). 
Both components also exhibit a similar time pattern, which also coincides with that of 
the growth rate of assets, suggesting that the components do not cancel each other. 
Both returns and injections expand during good times and experience severe 
contractions during periods of financial turmoil. Across types of funds by target region, 
the most salient pattern is the large growth in injections to funds specialized in BRICs. 
The relative variability of returns and injections for equity and bond funds can 
also be used to explain the variance of the growth rates of assets within funds. Among 
equity funds, the variances of returns and injections explain roughly the same fraction of 
the variability of the growth rate of assets (Table 2, Panel A). On average, the 
variances of returns and injections explain, respectively, 47% and 53% of fund asset 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
assets under management they would only bias the levels of the variables but cancel out when computing 
the returns and flows relative to initial assets. 19 
 
growth variability.
18 Among bond funds, however, the volatility of injections is behind 
most of the overall variability in asset growth, explaining 89% of it. These results show 
that price fluctuations are important drivers of the variation of the gross asset positions 
of investors, especially in equity, which is consistent with valuation effects having 
potentially important consequences for movements in net foreign asset positions too 
(Gourinchas and Rey, 2007b). 
The variance decompositions reported above consider the whole period with 
available data. However, it is possible that the contributions of returns and injections 
vary between tranquil and crisis periods. This is indeed the case. Table 3 shows that 
return variability plays a much more important role during crisis times. For instance, 
during the global crisis the contribution of return variability to overall variance of 
equity funds is 67%, compared to a 37% contribution in the four years leading to the 
beginning of the crisis. Table 3, Panel B also shows that among bond funds, the 
contribution of return variability increases from 12% prior to the crisis to 19% during 
the crisis. These broad patterns tend to be relatively stable across fund types and crises. 
The previous results show that, at the fund level, both returns and injections 
contribute to the variability of asset growth. They also show that returns and injections 
vary over time in a manner that is consistent with the international business cycle. As 
                                                            
18 Following Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), we have equally imputed the covariance term to each 
component (returns and injections). That is, the share of the variance of the growth of assets explained by 
returns equals the ratio of the variance of returns plus the covariance between returns and injections to 
the variance of the growth of assets. The contemporaneous covariance between returns and injections is 
small and negative. 20 
 
said above, both returns and injections show sharp drops during times of financial 
turmoil, and lengthy expansions during tranquil times. It is, therefore, possible that the 
ability of returns and injections to explain variations in assets comes mainly from all 
these series sharing a common time component, but this is not the case, especially for 
injections. While a common time component can explain 59% and 20% of the variability 
of fund returns (for equity and bond funds, respectively), the same component explains 
only 5% and 9% of the variability of injections.
19  
A fund manager’s main decision is how to allocate his available funds across the 
different assets in which he may invest, in particular across the countries where the fund 
specializes. This decision may be driven by long-run structural factors behind the fund’s 
strategic asset allocation (expected returns, covariance of assets across countries, 
benchmarks being followed, and so forth), but it may also depend on short-run 
variations in these or other factors. Faced with shocks to the return of their investments 
or to injections by the underlying investors, fund managers may or may not decide to 
reallocate their investments within and across countries. This is important because 
weights that are relatively stable imply that only fluctuations in fund assets (either 
because of returns or injections) will impact capital flows. On the other hand, country 
weights that experience non-trivial fluctuations over time indicate that manager 
decisions, on how to let weights adjust to relative price changes or how to buy and sell 
assets differentially in different countries, play a role in international capital flows. 
                                                            
19 These figures correspond to the overall    of an ordinary least squares regression between each of these 
variables and a set of month fixed effects. 21 
 
Appendix 2 shows that country weights indeed fluctuate significantly across funds and 
over time. Next, we study in more detail the behavior of injections and weights. 
 
4.  Behavior of Investors and Managers 
The evidence above shows that both the underlying investors and managers change 
their positions over time, but tells us little about the ultimate determinants of mutual 
fund investments across countries. For instance, it does not show us how investors and 
managers respond to crises and shocks. These responses are crucial to understand if this 
type of financial intermediaries may contribute to or dampen the transmission of crises 
across countries. To advance in our understanding of their behavior, we model how 
injections and weights vary over time using some parsimonious models that, nonetheless, 
capture basic and important properties of the data.  
Underlying investors may link their injections into a fund to attributes that vary 
at the fund level and over time. Therefore, to study the behavior of injections we regress 
them on variables measuring the occurrence of crises (both at the countries of destiny of 
a fund and the global level), returns of the fund, and returns of its country of origin. 
This allows us to test, for example, if investors inject more resources into a fund when it 
is performing well, as previously shown for U.S. mutual funds by Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), among others. It also permits us to estimate how investors react to changes in 
the conditions experienced by the countries in which funds invest, measured by crisis at 
the country of destiny. Furthermore, investors are also affected by shocks such as global 22 
 
crises and changes in the conditions at their country of origin, which can lead to change 
their investments in the type of international mutual funds we analyze. During good 
times, investors may feel richer and desire to invest more internationally and diversify 
risk, and vice versa. But it could also be the case that investors prefer to invest more 
internationally when conditions in their home countries worsen, since international 
markets might provide better prospects in relative terms. Ex-ante, these effects are not 
obvious. Investors may react to different types of shocks pro-cyclically, counter-
cyclically, or not react at all. 
We sequentially regress the injections to a fund on a weighted country crisis 
dummy, a dummy variable taking the value one during periods of global turmoil, lagged 
fund returns, and the returns of the fund’s country of origin.
20,21 This is akin to an 
augmented version of the specification estimated by Sirri and Tufano (1998) for U.S. 
                                                            
20 In the regressions, we normalize the injections to a fund (given by Equation (2)) by the average assets 
instead of the initial assets to isolate fluctuations in injections from fluctuations in initial assets. Results 
using injections normalized by initial assets (available upon request) are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar to those reported here, but estimators are less precise because of the additional volatility of the 
denominator in the expression. 
21 The weighted country crisis dummy is constructed using yearly country crisis data, weighted by the 
fund’s country portfolio weights at the beginning of the year. The crisis variable comes from Broner et al. 
(2010) and dates a crisis the years when a country suffers at least a banking, debt, or currency crisis, 
according to indicators widely used in the literature. The periods of global turmoil are: July 1997-
December 1997 (the Asian crisis), August 1998-December 1998 (the Russian crisis), March 2001-December 
2001 (the dotcom bust, September 11, and the Enron scandal), and September 2008-June 2009 (the global 
financial crisis). Fund returns are computed from fund-price data. Returns of the fund’s country of origin 
are measured using a broad equity price index from the country where the fund is located. Funds that are 
domiciled in Luxembourg are matched with country returns from Belgium since there are no available 
indexes for bonds and equity from Luxembourg. 23 
 
mutual funds.
22 In addition, the regressions include, alternatively, fixed effects at the 
fund, time, and country of origin-time levels. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country of origin-time level to control for correlation in injections to funds located in the 
same country.
23 
The results reported in Table 4 show that injections to both equity and bond 
funds fall when the countries of destiny are affected by crises (Column (1)) and in 
periods of global crises (Column (2)). On the contrary, injections increase in response to 
the lagged returns of the fund (Column (3)), which are presumably observable by the 
underlying investors, and in response to increases in the contemporaneous returns in the 
country of origin of the fund (Column (4)), which capture local conditions. Interestingly, 
among both equity and bond funds, the coefficient on lagged fund returns is lower than 
that for country of origin returns. One can interpret this difference as suggesting that 
wealth effects are stronger than substitution effects (across funds). A decline in local 
conditions does not itself lead investors to increase their investments in international 
funds to take advantage of equity return differentials or “carry-trade” effects (in cases 
when these declines are associated with low interest rates). Nonetheless, controlling for 
the conditions in the country of origin, more money flows into (or less money gets out 
of) the better performing funds.  
                                                            
22 Sirri and Tufano (1998) include a longer set of lags of injections and fund returns in their specification. 
We also estimated a version including up to three lags of both variables obtaining similar results. 
23 Clustering estimations by time yields very similar results to using clusters by country of origin-time. 24 
 
The regression in Column (5) includes all the previous variables simultaneously 
and shows similar coefficients than those obtained in the single-variable regressions, 
except for the impact of country crisis on equity funds. This indicates that while in 
some cases the country-crisis variable is capturing the variation coming from periods of 
global turmoil, the potential correlation between global crises and returns at the fund 
and country level is not behind the significant results obtained in the previous columns.  
Quantitatively, a global crisis reduces injections to equity funds by about 1 
percentage point. This is much larger than the average monthly injection of about 0.1 
percentage points, and 20% of the interquartile range of variation of injections over 
average assets (5 percentage points). Similarly, a 10% decline in fund returns also 
reduces injections by 1 percentage point. Since crises and fund returns are negatively 
correlated, the joint impact of crises is larger. Finally, a 10% decline in the returns of 
the country of origin (domicile) of the fund reduces injections by 2 percentage points. 
The quantitative importance of these variables for bond funds is higher. For instance, a 
global crisis reduces injections to bond funds by 3 percentage points. Although the 
average injection over average assets for these funds is also higher (1.3% instead of 0.1% 
for equity funds) the interquartile range of variation is similar than in equity funds 
(5%). Thus, because of greater coefficients, injections to bond funds react more strongly 
to returns and crises in the target countries and the country of origin.   
The regressions in Columns (6) and (7) add time and country of origin-time fixed 
effects to the regression in Column (5), respectively. In both cases, and among equity 25 
 
and bond funds, the impact of country crisis declines and becomes statistically 
insignificant (the global crisis variable is dropped from the regression in both cases 
because it varies only with time). This confirms that the identification of the coefficient 
in Column (1) comes mainly from a common, time-varying component, and not from 
the idiosyncratic incidence of crises in individual countries. Lagged fund returns and 
country returns remain statistically significant, except when including country of origin-
time fixed effects for bond funds, where the coefficient for these returns retains the 
magnitude but becomes marginally significant (with a p-value of 0.11). 
The results above show that the underlying investors respond to local and 
international conditions when deciding whether to inject or withdraw money from 
mutual funds. Fund managers must then choose how to allocate or liquidate positions in 
response to these injections/redemptions and the realized returns of their investments. It 
is this response (or lack thereof) that ultimately determines the net inflows/outflows to 
the countries where each fund invests.  
To empirically study the behavior of fund managers, we start with the following 
identity that relates the country portfolio weights of a fund in two subsequent periods 
             
              
            
, 
(3) 
where      is the portfolio weight of fund   in country   at time  ,      and     are the 
gross returns of the investments of the fund in country   and across its whole portfolio, 
respectively. Finally,       is the net flow of money from fund   to country   at time  , 
expressed as a fraction of the fund’s initial assets in the country       , and      is the 26 
 
injection/redemption of funds into (out of) fund   by its underlying investors, expressed 
as a fraction of the initial assets of the fund      .
24 
The expression in Equation (3) simply states that the weight of a country in a 
fund portfolio at the end of time   depends on the country’s initial portfolio weight, the 
return of the fund’s investment in the country, the return of the whole fund portfolio, 
the fund’s new net inflows into and out of the country, and the fund’s 
injections/redemptions. Intuitively, in absence of any type of flows (by the fund across 
countries or to the fund), the portfolio weight of a country would increase (decrease) 
only if the country assets have a higher (lower) return than those of other countries in 
the fund portfolio. Henceforth, we will refer to the counterfactual country portfolio 
weight in absence of any new flows or injections,        /    as the buy-and-hold weight. 
The presence of injections adds another layer of variation in relative weights because 
they would require the fund to allocate new money across countries or to liquidate 
positions that may result in changes in portfolio weights. Furthermore, the flows to 
different countries do not need to be linked to injections; even in the absence of the 
latter, managers might decide to change country weights by reallocating positions across 
countries. While Equation (3) is an identity, it does not imply any specific behavior for 
country portfolio weights at time   because funds have the liberty, in principle, to 
relocate funds across countries as they see fit (through variations in      ) to achieve a 
given portfolio composition.  
                                                            
24 As explained in Section 2, for data availability reasons we assume that the returns of all funds i 
investing in country j are identical; namely,            across funds. 27 
 
The discussion above shows that Equation (3) is a useful starting point to 
analyze the behavior of portfolio weights. Log-linearizing that equation around a state 
with gross returns equal to one and zero injections, one obtains the following expression 
                                                        ,   (4) 
where       is the log of     , lowercase   represents the corresponding net returns 
associated with the gross returns described above, and     and      are the main 
components of a second order approximation error.
25 This expression clearly shows that 
in the absence of relative flows               there is complete pass-through from relative 
returns              into weights (to a first order log approximation). 
We allow the relative flows (which are at the complete discretion of fund 
managers) to depend on lagged weights, relative returns, and the incidence of crises as 
follows, 
               δ           η             γ                  .   (5) 
     is a dummy variable that takes the value one if country   experiences a crisis at time 
 ,     is a country of destiny-fund fixed effect, and      is an error term.  ,  , and   are 
parameters that capture the sensitivity of relative flows to lagged weights, relative 
returns, and crises, and the rest of the notation is the same as above. The inclusion of 
relative returns as determinants of relative flows is standard in the literature (e.g. Hau 
and Rey, 2008). We augment this dependence of flows on country performance by 
                                                            
25 We separate the two components because the     term that contains expressions on    
  and     
  may 
become especially important when these variables significantly deviate from the approximation point. It 
may be, therefore, useful to control for them in a non-parametric manner.  28 
 
including the crisis indicator. Finally, the presence of lagged weights captures the 
possibility that flows respond to deviations of those weights from some desired target 
level.  
Replacing Equation (5) back in Equation (4), we obtain the following empirical 
specification for the evolution of fund portfolio weights, 
                                                        ,  (6) 
where   1   ,   1   , and the rest of the notation is the same as above. This is 
an estimable equation that allows us to study the determinants of a fund’s country 
portfolio allocations and, replacing the estimated parameters back in Equation (5), the 
determinants of its relative flows.
26,27  
Table 5 reports estimates of Equation (6) for equity funds (Panel A) and bond 
funds (Panel B). The regression includes country weights in the target region of a fund 
(i.e., in countries within the main scope of investment), and excludes cash weights, 
which are analyzed separately. The first five columns report the main parameters of 
                                                            
26 Note that the model described by Equation (6) corresponds to a dynamic panel and that omitting the 
fund-country fixed effect, or cleaning it by taking differences will result in inconsistent parameters, 
especially for the lagged weights (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Estimating the fixed effects using the least 
squares dummy variable estimator is still asymptotically biased, but the bias is of the order of 1/T, where 
T is the time-series length of the typical fund. Since T is relatively large (50 observations for the median 
fund), this bias is small. Including and estimating the fixed effects is important. 
27 Although it is possible that the process for log weights has a unit root and that standard t-stats cannot 
be reliably used, standard panel unit root tests (Im-Pesharan) reject the hypothesis of a unit root in log 
weights. Second, as we report below, we also estimate specifications where the dependent variable is the 
difference between log current weights and the buy-and-hold benchmark. These differences should be 
stationary under both the null of a unit root and the alternative. Finally, as we describe next, we estimate 
the specification at lower frequencies (semi-annual and annual) that make much more likely for weights to 
differ from past weights.  29 
 
Equation (6) including different combinations of fixed effects that capture the different 
sources of variation of the data. The results in Column (1) include no fixed effects, while 
the results in Column (2) include fund and time fixed effects that decompose     on its 
two dimensions. The results in Column (2) show that the coefficients are very similar to 
those without fixed effects and that these sources of variation do not have much 
explanatory power.
28 In the two columns, the coefficient on both lagged weights and 
relative returns are significantly positive, meaning that weights are serially correlated 
and positively correlated with relative returns.  
The conclusions from the first two columns of Table 5 are not robust to the 
inclusion of other sets of fixed effects capturing shocks of higher dimensions. Columns 
(3), (4), and (5) include, alternatively and jointly, fund-time fixed effects and country of 
destiny-fund fixed effects. The results in Column (3), which include fund-time fixed 
effects, exhibit a significant increase in the coefficient for relative returns. They indicate 
that the low coefficient on relative returns documented in the initial columns is largely 
due to fund-level, time-varying shocks, such as those to injections and fund returns that 
are part of the approximation error in Equation (4).
29 When including the country of 
                                                            
28 Results controlling for shocks to the fund at the country of origin level (unreported) are also similar to 
those obtained without fixed effects and to those obtained with fund and time fixed effects, indicating 
that shocks at the level of country of origin do not play an important role in the dispersion of portfolio 
allocations. 
29 For instance, in the nonlinear version of the identity (Equation (3)) the impact of fund returns on 
weights depends, among other things, on its injections. If these injections are large, weights would be 
mainly driven by these injections and respond relatively less to returns. Furthermore, from an 
econometric standpoint, these fixed effects also control for time variation in the within-fund (across-30 
 
destiny-fund fixed effects (Column (4)), the coefficient on lagged weight declines 
significantly relative to the other columns. This is consistent with the existence of some 
stable “target” component of weights per country for each fund.  
Including only the two sets of fixed effects that have some impact on the 
coefficients (country of destiny-fund and fund-time fixed effects), the regressions in 
Column (5) show that at the monthly level there is an important, albeit incomplete, 
degree of pass-through of relative returns to weights. Managers do not undo to an 
important extent the short-term impact of relative returns on their positions, and let 
them erode as a result of low returns. Using Equation (5) to uncover the behavior of 
relative flows, we find that they are weakly negatively related to relative returns at a 
monthly frequency.
30  
The regression in Column (6) further investigates the pro-cyclicality of fund 
allocations by including a country-crisis dummy, as in Equation (6), to test if funds 
react especially to crises periods. The results show that funds decrease their exposure to 
countries that experience crises. A crisis results in a 2% decline in the weights assigned 
to the affected country, on top of the decline implied by the relative returns. The strong 
negative relation between portfolio weights and country crises implies that fund flows 
also respond negatively to them. Thus, while relative flows are neutral or mildly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
countries) dispersion of weights (captured in the average log weight), and identifies the importance of 
relative returns using only within-fund, across-countries variation in returns and allocations. 
30 For the readers interested directly in the parameters of the flow Equation (5), Appendix Table 8 reports 
the same regressions shown in Table 5 but using relative flows (the difference between log weights, log 
lagged weights, and net relative returns) as dependent variable. The conclusions from this exercise remain 
the same. 31 
 
contrarian during normal times, as shown in Column (6), they are strongly pro-cyclical 
during crises. 
It is important, however, to be cautious about interpreting the contrarian 
behavior of relative flows during normal times as implying that funds wish to increase 
their exposure to underperforming countries. To reach that conclusion, one requires a 
model of the relation between relative flows and desired weights. Appendix 3 presents a 
simple but very flexible partial adjustment model of this relation, and shows that under 
reasonable assumptions, the results reported above are consistent with desired weights 
that are positively related to relative returns. The intuition for this apparent 
contradiction is that in the model relative flows depend on the difference between the 
fund’s desired and initial (buy-and-hold) weights. If desired weights are higher (lower) 
than buy-and-hold weights, money flows into (out of) a country. Since a decline in 
relative returns has a direct one-to-one pass-through impact on the buy-and-hold 
portfolio weights, if desired weights decline less than one-to-one with relative returns, 
relative flows would tend to move in a contrarian manner (even when desired weights 
decline with a fall in returns). 
The last two columns of Table 5 repeat the specification in Column (6) using 
data aggregated at different frequencies. The results show that the importance of pass-
through declines at lower frequencies, as funds have more time to adjust their positions 
after changes in relative prices. The same is valid for the response of flows which are 
more negatively related to relative returns as the frequency of data is reduced. 32 
 
Nonetheless, the negative relation between weights, flows, and crises is present at all 
frequencies. 
The results for bond funds (Table 5, Panel B) are broadly similar to those for 
equity funds, but while the coefficients move in the same manner when various fixed 
effects are added, the pass-through of returns on weights is much smaller than among 
equity funds, implying that the underlying relative flows respond to returns in a 
contrarian fashion.
31 Quantitatively, a decline of 10 percentage points in a country’s 
relative returns reduces its weight on about 6%. The response of weights and flows to 
crises is negative but statistically insignificant. Bond funds seem to behave in a more 
contrarian way than equity funds. This behavior may result from a lack of ability to 
quickly liquidate bonds of countries suffering strong reversals, because of the lower 
liquidity of some bond markets. Thus, in the short run bond funds may be forced to 
liquidate positions in countries that do relatively better in order to meet redemptions, 
but as they can slowly accommodate their positions they react pro-cyclically to return 
differentials. Another possible explanation is that the unobserved benchmarks followed 
by bond funds do not react as fast as those of equity funds to relative country returns. 
Finally, as we show below, these findings may also be explained by higher precautionary 
holdings of cash by bond funds than by equity funds. 
We conducted a series of robustness checks on the results of the basic 
specifications reported in Table 5 without finding significant changes in our results. 
                                                            
31 Note that this does not necessarily imply a contrarian response of total country flows because relative 
flows are measured relative to the injections to the fund, which we know react negatively to bad news. 33 
 
Among these checks we estimated the model using only funds with at least three years 
of data, we added more lags of log weights and relative returns (up to three), we 
considered countries both inside and outside the relevant region, and we estimated the 
model separately for global equity funds and regional equity funds. In all cases, the 
qualitative and quantitative results (available upon request) are similar to those 
reported in Table 5. 
The log transformation used above and the regressions reported in Table 5 
discard the information contained in the zero weight countries. It is not obvious if these 
zeroes should be included or not because some cases may correspond to countries that 
are out of the scope of investment of a fund for reasons we do not observe (prospectus 
or underlying unobserved benchmark). To check the concern that the zeroes may 
contain useful information while minimizing the probability of zeroes that are related to 
the scope of the fund, we re-estimate the regressions in levels including only the zeroes 
corresponding to countries that are in the region or market segment declared as part of 
the scope of the fund. To maintain consistency with the equation in logs, we include as 
explanatory variables the level of the buy-and-hold weight and the country’s relative 
returns expressed as the ratio of the gross returns of the country and the portfolio. The 
results, shown in Table 6, are qualitatively consistent with those obtained with the 
specification in levels, despite significantly increasing the number of observations (from 
460,000 to 740,000): weights decline when relative returns fall and when a crisis hits a 
country. Quantitatively, the implied results are larger than in the log specifications. In 34 
 
equity funds, a 10% decline in relative returns would reduce weights by 1 percentage 
point, in addition to the pure pass-through effect. This is about 20% of the average 
weight (5%). The impact of a crisis is also larger: it results in a 10 percentage point 
decline in weights.   
Both equity and bond funds maintain a fraction of their assets in cash. This cash 
may be used as a buffer to park money before and after buying and selling assets, meet 
redemptions, and strategically take advantage of sudden investment opportunities. The 
regressions in Table 7 characterize the behavior of the cash weights in logs. In 
unreported results, we also ran the same regression for cash in levels, obtaining similar 
results. The specifications are analogous to those reported above, with gross cash 
returns assumed to equal one so that relative returns correspond to minus fund net 
returns. Since cash weights vary only in the fund-time dimension, we limit the set of 
fixed effects included.  
The results in Table 7 show that a decline in equity fund returns results in an 
increase in cash. In other words, equity funds accumulate extra cash in bad times and 
reduce these positions in good times. Quantitatively, a 10% decline in the return of the 
fund results in a 7% increase in cash. The results also show a significantly lower pass-
through on cash weights, with coefficients on log lagged cash weights much smaller than 
one. The results in Column (3), which include time fixed effects, show that most of the 
positive relation between cash weights and cash relative returns results from variations 
in global conditions. After controlling for those fixed effects, the coefficient on relative 35 
 
returns, while still positive, becomes smaller than that of lagged weights and not 
significant. The regression in Column (4), without time fixed effects, shows that the 
variables capturing the prevalence of country and global crises are associated with both 
an increase in cash and a decline in the coefficients for relative returns, confirming that, 
to an important extent, the relevance of relative returns comes from global conditions. 
A fund experiencing a crisis in one of its target countries increases cash by 10% of the 
share of that country in its portfolio, and a fund experiencing a global crisis increases 
cash by 16%. Columns (5) and (6), focusing on the results at different frequencies, show 
again a smaller and vanishing degree of pass-through, indicating that at lower 
frequencies cash weights tend to converge to a target level that is not driven by price 
fluctuations. However, even at this level of aggregation country and global crises can 
explain some of the variation in cash weights.  
Interestingly, the response of cash weights to returns is much different in bond 
funds. Among these funds, cash moves in opposite direction to returns, even though 
pass-through would suggest a positive response. Bond funds seem to accumulate cash 
when fund returns are high (low relative returns). Why is this effect dominant only for 
bond funds? This result may be due to the stronger response of injections to returns 
among bond funds (Table 4): a high return results in injections that are temporarily 
parked in cash. Similarly, a bad fund return may require a decline in cash while the 
fund meets redemptions. Another explanation is that, since bond funds hold more cash 
on average, they are better able to respond to injections/redemptions through variations 36 
 
in cash without having to liquidate assets or relocate money across countries. This is 
only a proximate explanation because, of course, the level of cash held by bond funds is 
an endogenous choice. Nonetheless, one can rationalize both the level and cyclical 
fluctuations in cash if the bond markets where international funds invest are less liquid 
than the corresponding equity markets, so that funds cannot quickly adjust positions to 
meet redemptions without taking large losses through fire-sale prices, which may lead 
them to hoard more cash. These results can also explain the weaker response of country 
weights to relative returns among bond funds in the short run: a decline in country 
returns prompts bond funds to liquidate cash to meet redemptions, dampening the 
impact of this decline on the country weights. Results in levels including the zero cash 
weights are qualitatively similar to those in logs (unreported).  
 
5.  Gross and Net Country Flows: The Role of Investors and Managers 
We next quantify the relative importance of the underlying investors and managers in 
explaining the gross and net capital flows by mutual funds to different countries. “Gross 
flows” are the growth rate of total assets invested by mutual funds in a country 
(including returns of past investments). “Net flows” are inflows/outflows of money 
(gross flows minus the return in each country).
32  
                                                            
32 Note that this is a specific definition of gross and net flows that fits well with the discussion on this 
paper, but the literature has employed the terms with many other ways. For our computations, we use 
the growth rates of assets between two consecutive periods in a country using only the funds that have 
investments in that country in both periods. That is, we do not include entry-exit in the calculations. The 37 
 
The assets held by mutual funds in country   trivially correspond to the sum of 
the assets held in that country by each one   of the funds that invest in it,       ∑        . 
Taking log differences we obtain the following decomposition for the growth rate of total 
assets in a country (gross flows)  
        ∑                  ∑               , (7) 
where       denotes the growth rate of total mutual fund assets in country   at time  , 
                ⁄  is the share of total country   assets represented by fund  ,        is the 
growth of the weight of country   in the portfolio of fund   between   and   1  and, and 
      is the growth in total assets of fund   within the same interval. 
Equation (7) states that gross flows of money from mutual funds to a country 
may increase because funds increase the weight of that country in their portfolios, or 
because the total assets of the funds investing in the country are increasing. The 
economic interpretation of these two components as capturing the contribution of fund 
managers versus that of the underlying investors require to take a stance on the scope of 
activities within the realm of decision of each of these two sets of market participants. 
Assuming that changes in weights are the managers’ choice and the growth rate of fund 
assets is exogenously determined, one may interpret the first component as 
corresponding to the managers’ decision and the second component to that of the 
underlying investors. This is one of the decompositions we estimate below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
reason is that we do not know whether entry-exit in our sample corresponds to real entry-exit or 
variations in data coverage.  38 
 
The other main decomposition we use works with net flows to a country (growth 
in total assets net of returns,     ) by isolating the contribution of the growth in weights 
net of returns (relative flows) and injections to net flows, in the following manner, 
                                      
 
              
 
   
                            
 
              .
 
  (8) 
A nice feature of the decomposition in Equation (8) is that both terms have a 
very clear economic interpretation. The first term is the change in weights net of 
relative returns, which corresponds to relative flows of managers to a country, and the 
second corresponds to injections/redemptions into the fund. The flows of fund money to 
country   increase either because the fund manager is investing relatively more money 
into the country or because the fund has injections by the underlying investors that are 
proportionally allocated to all countries. For additional information including two other 
decompositions see Appendix 4. 
The results of the decompositions in Equations (7) and (8) are reported in two 
separate panels of Table 8 and offer a good picture of the role of managers and investors 
in explaining gross and net flows of capital to countries. Each panel reports two sets of 
results: the average contribution of each of the two components to the level and 
variance of each type of flow.  
To illustrate what Table 8 reports, take the example of gross flows in Panel A. 
The calculation for the left side of the panel (the “shares”) is as follows: for each 
country and time we compute the share of each component (growth in weights and 39 
 
growth in fund assets) in the growth in the country’s gross assets. We then compute for 
each country the average over time of each of these components, and finally take their 
average across all countries in each of the groupings in the rows.
33 The right side of each 
panel (“variance decomposition”) reports a standard variance decomposition exercise, 
where we assess the share of the total variance of gross flows that can be attributed to 
each component. Again, we first conduct the variance decomposition at the country 
level and then average across countries to reach the reported estimates. Since the two 
terms are not orthogonal, we follow Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire (2005) and impute the 
covariance term equally to each component (see Section 3). 
Table 8, Panel A shows that both components of Equation (7) have roughly a 
similar impact on the level and fluctuations in gross assets (around a 40%-60% split 
depending on the decomposition). That is, the growth of weights and the growth of fund 
assets are not very different in explaining the gross flows into countries, although the 
contribution of the former is largely due to fluctuations in relative returns that are 
correlated with the movement in gross flows. After controlling for this effect, managers 
explain 30% of the variation (Appendix 4). In sum, Panel A shows that variations in 
fund assets, resulting at least partly from the behavior of the underlying investors, 
explain an important share of the level and variability of gross flows. If one considers 
changes in weights due to variations in returns part of manager’s choices, managers 
                                                            
33 We use both a geographical grouping (Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America) and another one 
(developed, emerging, and non-emerging developing countries) taken from MSCI. Non-emerging 
developing countries are the ones considered frontier markets by MSCI. 40 
 
explain about 60% of the variance of gross flows. If not, they still explain a nontrivial, 
but smaller share.  
Table 8, Panel B shows the decomposition of net flows corresponding to Equation 
(8). The results are clearly different from those for gross flows. In this case, the first 
component, associated with manager’s behavior, explains a larger share of the level and 
variance of these flows. Net flows are more closely linked to managerial discretion than 
gross flows since they abstract from the effect of returns on the growth of asset holdings. 
For all countries, the growth rate of adjusted weights explains 88% of the level of net 
flows and 85% of their variance. Namely, the term associated with total injections 
explains 12% and 15% of the level and variance of net flows, respectively. The pattern is 
very similar across groups of countries.  
In summary, Table 8 shows that both managers and the underlying investors 
play a significant role in explaining the level and fluctuations of international gross and 
net flows but the relative importance of each of them varies with the type of flow. For 
gross flows, managers explain a share of the level and variance of flows of around 50%, 
when not adjusting for returns and depending on the specific decomposition and region. 
For net flows, however, the bulk of the level and variance of flows (between 77% and 
88%) can be explained by manager’s behavior. Managerial discretion, measured as 
deviations of country allocations from buy-and-hold allocations, is very important in 
explaining the flows of new money to countries. 41 
 
Table 9 shows the same decompositions as in Table 8 for all countries but for 
different groups of funds. In each case, the gross and net flows to a country correspond 
only to the flows coming from that subset of funds. The table also shows decompositions 
at different frequencies: semi-annual and annual instead of monthly. Not surprisingly, 
the growth of total weights, capturing manager’s behavior, explains always a much 
larger fraction of the level and volatility of gross flows for active funds than for passive 
funds. For instance, Table 9, Panel A shows that the growth of weights accounts for 
49% and 58% of the level and variance of gross flows for active funds, versus 22% and 
32% for passive funds, respectively. Panel B shows that the difference between active 
and passive funds in the contribution of manager’s behavior to net flows is even larger: 
87% of the level and variance for active funds, and 15% of the level and 31% of the 
variance for passive funds, respectively. Namely, the gross and net flows of capital from 
passive funds to countries respond mainly to the behavior of the underlying investors. 
Regarding the difference between bond and equity funds, manager’s behavior seems to 
play a slightly larger role among bond funds, for both gross and net flows. Regarding 
the differences between monthly, semi-annual, and annual frequencies, Table 9 shows a 
clear pattern. For both levels and variances of gross and net flows, the role of manager’s 
behavior declines with the increase in the length of the period of analysis. Although as 
seen in Section 4, the ability of managers to change country weights with respect to a 
buy-and-hold benchmark increases with time, it is also the case that the underlying 42 
 
investors can react further to fund performance, country conditions, or other shocks. At 
lower frequencies, the investor side seems to become relatively more important. 
In addition to providing a quantitative assessment of the relative importance of 
manager’s and underlying investor’s choices for mutual fund capital flows to target 
countries, the decompositions above, together with our previous estimations, allow us to 
obtain some back-of-the-envelope calculations of the impact of various shocks on capital 
flows. Let us start with Equation (7) for gross flows. From Table 4 we know that a 10% 
decline in (lagged) fund returns reduces injections by about 1 percentage point. Thus, if 
all funds investing in a country experience such a decline in returns, gross flows will 
decline in 1 percentage point through its impact on the total assets of these funds (the 
second term in Equation (7)). This is close to the median gross flows across countries 
(about 2%) and indicates that there may be important contagion effects through the 
injections of the underlying investors. Similarly, a 10% decline in the returns of the 
country where the funds are located will reduce injections to these funds by 2 
percentage points. If funds located in the country experiencing the decline are important 
for a target country, the decline in gross flows will be significant. From Table 6 we also 
find that a decline in the relative return of a country has almost a one-to-one impact on 
the growth of weights at a monthly frequency. Keeping fund returns constant, a 10% 
decline in relative returns results in a 10% decline in the weight of that country in 
mutual fund portfolios and may induce a similar decline in gross flows. A country crisis 43 
 
also has an important effect, reducing the growth of weights by almost 2%, with a 
corresponding decline in gross flows. 
A similar set of calculations can be conducted to estimate the impact of various 
shocks on net (mutual fund) capital flows to a country using Equation (8). Changes in 
fund injections have the same direct impact on net flows than in gross flows, so a 10% 
decline in last period returns may reduce net inflows by 1 percentage point, or a 10% 
decline in the returns in the country of origin of the funds may contract inflows by 2 
percentage points. Relative returns also matter. As discussed above, Table 5 shows that 
a 10% decline in relative returns results in a 0.5 percentage point increase in relative 
flows, which is considerable relative to the (unweighted) average growth of net flows in 
the sample (minus 1.5%). However, if this relative return decline is accompanied by a 
low fund performance or by low returns in the country of origin of funds that induce 
large redemptions, the consequences for net capital flows may still be severe (3 to 4 
percentage point decline).  
 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper has shown that mutual funds help transmit crises across countries and that 
their behavior is driven by both the underlying investors and managers. The global 
crisis was no exception, when there were large reallocations across countries and regions. 
In particular, the paper has shown that investors react to shocks by pulling out of funds 
that invest in countries undergoing crises and during global crisis times. In addition, 44 
 
investors put more capital into funds that have shown to do relatively well and when 
conditions in their country of origin improve. This pro-cyclical reaction of investors is 
matched with a similar behavior by fund managers, who face not only shocks from 
investors injecting and redeeming capital but also from valuation changes in the 
countries in which they invest. Managers react to these shocks by allowing weights to 
adjust almost pari passu with returns and partly by moving allocations out of countries 
experiencing crises. This adjustment of managers takes place over time, with the pass-
through from returns to weights diminishing at lower frequencies. During crises, 
managers of equity funds also tend to accumulate more cash. All these patterns are 
consistent with how investors and managers behaved during the global crises, when 
there was retrenchment from emerging economies and Europe and a reallocation 
towards the U.S. 
The findings in this paper have important implications for the theoretical 
literature and policy discussions. They suggest that, in a world where investors 
discipline managers through injections and redemptions and there are large shocks, 
managers of open-ended funds might have difficulties taking advantage of long-term 
arbitrage opportunities and reacting counter-cyclically, for example by buying assets 
internationally at fire-sale prices. Therefore, the evidence is not consistent with 
international deep-pocket investors (mutual funds in this case) playing a stabilizing role. 
To the contrary, these investors appear fickle.  45 
 
Regarding the difference between debt and equity, the paper shows that the 
results are not unique to demandable debt, where the need to get out first is more 
imperative. The pro-cyclicality occurs even in equity funds, for which prices adjust 
instantaneously, suggesting that limited information by investors, and/or other factors, 
need to be playing an important role. While in equity funds cash is used pro-cyclically, 
being accumulated during crises, in bond funds cash is used more as a buffer, reducing 
the impact of redemptions on manager reallocations. This could suggest that managers 
have more difficulty buying and selling assets in markets that might be more illiquid, 
and thus use more cash to withstand the shocks they face. The results also suggest that, 
when there is a shock in a country where funds invest, equity funds tend to amplify the 
shock by acting pro-cyclically, while bond funds might help transmit shocks across 
countries by acting in relative terms counter-cyclically in that country, generating 
contagion effects. However, when the shock hits the country of origin where funds are 
domiciled, both bond and equity funds reduce their investments abroad, implying that 
wealth effects might be significant. These wealth effects tend to dominate the 
substitution effects across countries and constitute a mechanism of cross-country crisis 
transmission. 
The evidence also shows that weights are not constant over time. In fact, they 
fluctuate substantially with shocks. In other words, it is not the case that investors 
drive all the action and managers act as passive agents, allocating the injections they 
receive into countries according to some approximate fixed weights. While changes in 46 
 
weights might partly reflect monthly changes in the benchmark indexes (changing with 
returns), the findings also suggest that adjustment costs might play a role in manager 
behavior. Valuation changes pass-through to portfolios weights almost entirely in the 
short run; only over time they get adjusted and somewhat reverse to pre-shock levels. 
These adjustment costs could take place because it is difficult for managers to adjust 
immediately to the shocks they receive and react to them in the short run by buying or 
selling assets in certain countries (perhaps liquid ones), before adjusting the portfolio 
elsewhere. These effects are more pronounced during crisis times, since in relative terms 
during normal times managers reallocate their portfolio towards countries that get 
negative shocks. For example, equity fund flows are slightly counter-cyclical during 
normal times and pro-cyclical during crises. These differences are consistent with 
adjustment costs being larger during crises and shed light on the heterogeneity of 
behavior of equity funds over time. The evidence could also indicate to some extent that 
the managers’ target or desired weights themselves change over time and fluctuate with 
returns.  
The findings in this paper have important implications for the policy discussion 
as well. In particular, some of the proposals after the global crisis suggest a shift from 
banks to a mutual fund model to avoid runs and contagion effects. This paper shows 
that this shift will not necessarily solve the problem that banks entail and that runs and 
contagion are possible even in equity funds. The findings also suggest that idiosyncratic 
risk and market discipline play only a limited role during crises and, thus, regulation 47 
 
based on those pillars (such as Basel II) would not entirely isolate the financial system 
from crises. Furthermore, to the extent that open-ended structures constrain long-term 
arbitrage, there could be socially excessive open-ending and it might be desirable to 
have more closed-end funds. However, open-ended funds provide more room for 
investors to monitor managers and avoid moral hazard problems, implying a difficult 
trade-off between monitoring and long-term investments (Stein, 2005). Another area for 
possible policy action is the potential for mutual funds to become a source of instability 
in domestic markets, pushing prices away from fundamental values. Recent work 
suggests that this might be the case (Jotikasthira et al., 2009). Finally, the findings in 
this paper imply that shocks to the supply side of funds are hard to dismiss. The actions 
by different players within institutions interact and get magnified, plus foreign investors 
(in this case mutual funds) play no stabilizing role by buying at fire-sale prices. This has 
important policy lessons in terms of liquidity provision and moral hazard. To the extent 
that shocks come from the supply side of funds, providing liquidity at times of crisis 
might help stabilize markets and countries. If instead crises were country specific with 
investors expecting unreasonable rates of returns, providing financing at times of crisis 
might fuel moral hazard. 
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  A. Equity Funds
Figure 1
Evolution of Total Assets in Mutual Funds
Panel A presents the total amount of assets in equity funds. The upper figure presents the period January 1996
to December 2000, and the lower figure presents the period June 2001 to November 2010. Panel B presents the

























































































































































































































































































Portfolio Weights during the Global Financial Crisis: Equity Funds 
This figure presents the evolution of the average portfolio weights invested in different regions by equity funds during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Only countries with stock market price index data are
considered to compute the weights. Regions are aggregated according to the EPFR Global classification. Only funds that have complete coverage for the period under study (Jan. 2007 - Dec. 2009) are considered. The grey
bars indicate times of stock market turmoil or the fall of financial institutions. In chronological order, they represent: the nationalization of Northern Rock (Sep. 2007), the Bear Stearns collapse (Mar. 2008), the Lehman









































































































































































































































































































































































































Portfolio Weights during the Global Financial Crisis: Bond Funds 
This figure presents the evolution of the average portfolio weights invested in different regions by bond funds during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Only countries with bond market price index data are
considered to compute the weights. Regions are aggregated according to the EPFR Global classification. Only funds that have complete coverage for the period under study (Jan. 2007 - Dec. 2009) are considered. The grey
bars indicate times of stock market turmoil or the fall of financial institutions. In chronological order, they represent: the nationalization of Northern Rock (Sep. 2007), the Bear Stearns collapse (Mar. 2008), the Lehman



























































































































































































































































































































































































Cash Weights during the Global Financial Crisis
This figure presents the evolution of the average mutual fund portfolio cash weights during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Regions are aggregated 
according to the EPFR Global classification. Only funds that have complete coverage for the period under study (Jan. 2007 - Dec. 2009) are considered. The
grey bars indicate times of stock market turmoil or the fall of financial institutions. In chronological order, they represent: the nationalization of Northern










































































































































































































































































Median Growth Rate of Assets, Returns, and Injections
Panels A, B, and C present, respectively, the median growth rate of total assets, the median fund rate of return, and the median injection over initial assets
for equity and bond funds. All variables are first calculated within funds, and then the median is obtained at each point in time considering only continuing
funds. Shaded areas indicate times of global turmoil.























































































































































































































































































































































Median Number of 
Observations per 
Fund (Months)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Funds 965 54,940 Nov. 10 47











(1) (2) (1) (2)
By Strategy
Active Funds 1,025 58,383 Passive Funds 51 1,049
By Target Region
Equity Funds Equity Funds
Asia Ex-Japan 201 13,365 Global Emerging 187 12,972
BRIC 18 610 Latin America 91 6,068
Emerg. Europe, Middle East, and Africa 38 1,253 Pacific 41 2,442
Emerging Europe 91 6,580 Bond Funds
Europe 143 4,824 Global 30 1,096
Global 155 6,826 Global Emerging 81 3,396
By Domicile
Australia 5 167 Hong Kong 2 38
Austria 5 533 Ireland 104 5,571
Bahamas 3 56 Isle of Man 1 35
Bahrain 4 119 Japan 7 250
Belgium 5 295 Jersey 6 377
Bermuda 2 212 Luxembourg 400 21,528
British Virgin Islands 8 502 Mauritius 1 26
Canada 32 1,897 Netherlands Antilles 2 78
Cayman 15 881 Netherlands 4 239
Denmark 22 1,063 Singapore 3 198
Finland 9 321 Sweden 1 30
France 22 1,328 Switzerland 19 1,298
Germany 22 634 U.K. 137 9,313
Guernsey 15 1,138 U.S. 220 11,305
This table presents summary statistics on equity and bond mutual funds from the EPFR Global database. Panel A presents statistics across the
whole sample. Column (1) presents the number of funds in each category. Column (2) presents the number of monthly observations among all
funds within each category. Columns (3) and (4) present the first and last date, respectively, for which there are data available in each category.
Column (5) presents the median number of monthly reports within funds. Panel B presents the number of funds and observations by different
partitions. Funds are divided by strategy, target region, and according to the country in which the fund is based. The strategy classification
between active and passive is based on their stated investment behavior.
Mutual Fund Summary Statistics
Table 1
A. Whole Sample







Injections/    
Initial Assets
Returns
Injections/    
Initial Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Equity Funds 2.20% 1.01% 1.15% 10.34% 47.24% 52.76%
Asia Ex-Japan 2.44% 1.15% 1.24% 10.25% 41.12% 58.88%
BRIC 4.72% 1.33% 3.40% 13.82% 54.82% 45.18%
Emerg. Europe, Middle East, and Africa 1.56% -0.28% 1.86% 14.57% 33.26% 66.74%
Emerging Europe 2.81% 1.30% 1.35% 12.69% 48.22% 51.78%
Europe 0.65% 0.57% 0.11% 9.61% 38.39% 61.61%
Global 1.59% 0.71% 0.88% 6.96% 54.69% 45.31%
Global Emerging 2.85% 1.32% 1.46% 9.67% 49.57% 50.43%
Latin America 4.05% 1.61% 2.32% 13.11% 48.34% 51.66%




Injections/    
Initial Assets
Returns
Injections/    
Initial Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bond Funds 3.94% 0.69% 3.19% 8.66% 11.37% 88.63%
Global 0.61% 0.31% 0.60% 7.39% 9.31% 90.69%






Growth Rate of Assets, Returns, and Injections: Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the growth rate of total assets, rates of return, and injections over initial assets for mutual funds, and
the variance decomposition of the growth rate of assets. Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation, and variance decomposition for equity
funds, and Panel B for bond funds. Columns (1) - (3) present the mean growth rate of assets, returns, and injections over initial assets. The
reported values are obtained by calculating first the mean within funds and then obtaining the mean across funds. Column (4) is obtained by
calculating the standard deviation within funds and then the mean across funds for each fund type. Columns (5) and (6) are obtained by
calculating the variance within funds for the fund returns and injections over initial assets, and calculating their contribution to the variance of
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Injections/    
Initial Assets
Returns
Injections/    
Initial Assets
Returns
Injections/    
Initial Assets
Target Region (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Equity Funds 36.74% 63.26% 67.01% 32.99% 57.65% 42.35%
Asia Ex-Japan 35.97% 64.03% 71.11% 28.89% 57.41% 42.59%
BRIC 41.53% 58.47% 72.15% 27.85% 61.45% 38.55%
Emerg. Europe, Middle East, and Africa 17.47% 82.53% 60.51% 39.49% 52.81% 47.19%
Emerging Europe 40.07% 59.93% 69.37% 30.63% 63.54% 36.46%
Europe 19.98% 80.02% 51.33% 48.67% 44.36% 55.64%
Global 37.06% 62.94% 65.40% 34.60% 60.44% 39.56%
Global Emerging 33.54% 66.46% 70.15% 29.85% 64.71% 35.29%
Latin America 32.60% 67.40% 71.20% 28.80% 58.96% 41.04%
Pacific 37.38% 62.62% 65.15% 34.85% 58.90% 41.10%
Returns
Injections/    
Initial Assets
Returns
Injections/    
Initial Assets
Returns
Injections/    
Initial Assets
Target Region (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bond Funds 12.36% 87.64% 18.78% 81.22% 11.82% 88.18%
Global 5.18% 94.82% 2.66% 97.34% 4.45% 95.55%
Global Emerging 12.90% 87.10% 26.23% 73.77% 20.59% 79.41%
Wide Window (Mar. 2007-Oct. 2010)
B. Variance Decomposition of the Growth Rate of Assets for Bond Funds
Period
Before the Global Crisis During the Global Crisis  During the Global Crisis
 (Jan. 2003-Feb. 2007) Narrow Window (Mar. 2008-Dec. 2009) Wide Window (Mar. 2007-Oct. 2010)
Table 3
Variance Decomposition of the Growth Rate of Assets around the Global Financial Crisis
This figure reports the variance decomposition of the growth rate of assets around the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Panel A and B report this decomposition for
equity funds and bond funds, respectively. Injections are obtained at the fund level as the difference between the total net assets (TNAs) and lagged TNAs multiplied by
returns. Columns (1)-(6) are obtained by computing the variance within funds and then across funds for the respective target region. Since the two terms are not
orthogonal, the covariance term is imputed equally to each component.
A. Variance Decomposition of the Growth Rate of Assets for Equity Funds
Period
Before the Global Crisis During the Global Crisis  During the Global Crisis
 (Jan. 2003-Feb. 2007) Narrow Window (Mar. 2008-Dec. 2009)
60Country Crisis -0.048 *** -0.003 -0.009 -0.013
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Global Crisis -0.018 *** -0.008 **
(0.001) (0.004)
Lagged Fund Returns 0.161 *** 0.119 *** 0.171 *** 0.178 ***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.033) (0.039)
Country of Origin Returns 0.261 *** 0.222 *** 0.135 ***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.028)
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Country of Origin-Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 41,232 41,232 40,492 39,479 38,764 38,764 40,492
R-squared 0.035 0.036 0.047 0.050 0.065 0.114 0.174
Country Crisis -0.081 *** -0.070 *** -0.018 -0.031
(0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023)
Global Crisis -0.038 *** -0.028 ***
(0.006) (0.008)
Lagged Fund Returns 0.229 ** 0.205 ** 0.126 * 0.107
(0.111) (0.102) (0.070) (0.067)
Country of Origin Returns 0.464 *** 0.468 *** 0.337 ***
(0.148) (0.127) (0.121)
Fund Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No
Country of Origin-Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 3,520 3,520 3,445 3,261 3,196 3,196 3,445
R-squared 0.061 0.065 0.073 0.068 0.092 0.156 0.266
Variables
Injections/Average Assets





This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions at a monthly frequency of mutual fund injections over average assets on
different variables. Panel A presents the results for equity funds and Panel B for bond funds. The "country crisis" variable is a  dummy that
indicates if a country has a banking, debt, or currency crisis during a given year. The dummy is weighted by the relative contribution of the country
in the portfolio of a fund.  The "global crisis" variable is a dummy variable that indicates periods of worldwide crisis (Jul. 1997-Dec. 1997, Aug. 1998-
Dec. 1998, Mar. 2001-Dec. 2001, and Sept. 2008-Jun. 2009). "Country of origin returns" are the returns from indexes in the country where the fund is
based. Injections/average assets, "lagged fund returns," and "country of origin returns" are all expressed as decimals. Fund fixed effects are
included in every case and, alternatively, fixed effects at the time and country of origin-time levels are included. Standard errors are clustered by
country of origin-time. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variables
Injections/Average Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Equity Funds
61Log Lagged Weights 0.986 *** 0.982 *** 0.983 *** 0.899 *** 0.901 *** 0.901 *** 0.568 *** 0.307 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.026)
Relative Returns 0.622 *** 0.647 *** 0.993 *** 0.598 *** 0.959 *** 0.956 *** 0.857 *** 0.567 ***
(0.051) (0.057) (0.013) (0.049) (0.013) (0.013) (0.032) (0.035)
Country Crisis -0.020 *** -0.069 *** -0.118 ***
(0.003) (0.017) (0.026)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Fund-Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Destiny-Fund Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 458,458 458,458 458,458 458,458 458,458 458,458 62,949 26,018
R-squared 0.965 0.965 0.969 0.967 0.971 0.971 0.908 0.890
Variables
Log Lagged Weights 0.974 *** 0.969 *** 0.970 *** 0.868 *** 0.866 *** 0.866 *** 0.448 *** 0.102 *
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.037) (0.059)
Relative Returns 0.237 *** 0.238 *** 0.638 *** 0.219 *** 0.608 *** 0.611 *** 0.296 *** 0.310 ***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.079) (0.084) (0.073) (0.073) (0.101) (0.100)
Country Crisis -0.016 -0.017 -0.026
(0.011) (0.050) (0.084)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Fund-Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Destiny-Fund Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 39,183 39,183 39,183 39,183 39,183 39,183 5,035 1,959
R-squared 0.941 0.941 0.946 0.946 0.951 0.951 0.871 0.880
Monthly Semi Annual Annual
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Monthly Semi Annual Annual
B. Bond Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Table 5
Behavior of Log Country Weights
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of the log country weights on different variables. Panel A presents the results for equity funds
and Panel B for bond funds. The "country crisis" variable is a dummy that indicates if a country has a banking, debt, or currency crisis during a given year. The
"relative returns" variable is the difference between country net returns and fund net returns, expressed as decimals. Estimations are performed at different
frequencies and include different combinations of fixed effects. Only countries in the target region are considered for each type of fund. Errors are clustered by
country of origin-time. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variables
Log Country Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Equity Funds
Log Country Weights
62Buy-and-Hold Weight (in %) 0.987 *** 0.984 *** 0.988 *** 0.893 *** 0.913 *** 0.913 *** 0.648 *** 0.461 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.109) (0.050)
Relative Returns -1.782 *** -1.619 *** 0.045 -1.512 *** 0.181 *** 0.173 *** 0.864 *** 1.011 ***
(0.192) (0.206) (0.044) (0.138) (0.045) (0.044) (0.109) (0.140)
Country Crisis -0.093 *** -0.371 *** -0.602 ***
(0.021) (0.086) (0.105)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Date Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Fund-Date Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Destiny-Fund Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 741,776 741,776 741,776 741,776 741,776 741,776 105,222 44,146
R-squared 0.982 0.982 0.985 0.984 0.986 0.986 0.951 0.935
Buy-and-Hold Weight (in %) 0.971 *** 0.970 *** 0.971 *** 0.859 *** 0.861 *** 0.861 *** 0.440 *** 0.035
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.070) (0.146)
Relative Returns -1.563 *** -1.540 *** -1.053 *** -1.359 *** -0.917 *** -0.914 *** -0.120 0.905 *
(0.184) (0.187) (0.273) (0.168) (0.234) (0.234) (0.283) (0.529)
Country Crisis -0.102 * -0.340 -0.575
(0.060) (0.369) (0.649)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Date Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Fund-Date Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Destiny-Fund Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 93,819 93,819 93,819 93,819 93,819 93,819 13,116 5,508
R-squared 0.961 0.961 0.962 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.891 0.871
Annual
B. Bond Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables
Country Weights (in %)
Monthly Semi-Annual Annual
Table 6
Behavior of Country Weights
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of the country weights on different variables. Panel A presents the results for equity funds and Panel B
for bond funds. The "buy-and-hold weight" variable is the lagged weight multiplied by the ratio of gross country return to gross fund return. The "relative returns"
variable is the difference between country net returns and fund net returns, expressed as decimals. Estimations are performed at the different frequencies and include
different combinations of fixed effects. Only countries in the target region are considered for each type of fund. Errors are clustered by country of origin-time. Standard
errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables
Country Weights (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Equity Funds
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Monthly Semi-Annual
63Log Lagged Weights 0.587 *** 0.389 *** 0.360 *** 0.377 *** 0.112 *** -0.083
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.024) (0.050)
Relative Returns 0.729 *** 0.700 *** 0.169 * 0.494 *** 0.188 *** -0.181
(0.083) (0.102) (0.088) (0.099) (0.071) (0.138)
Country Crisis 0.096 * 0.116 0.498 *
(0.051) (0.158) (0.284)
Global Crisis 0.158 *** 0.116 ** 0.111
(0.018) (0.049) (0.101)
Country of Origin Returns -0.168 -0.437 *** -0.034
(0.116) (0.097) (0.119)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No
Number of Observations 33,681 33,681 33,681 32,416 4,226 1,515
R-squared 0.347 0.433 0.452 0.434 0.435 0.523
Log Lagged Weights 0.654 *** 0.449 *** 0.446 *** 0.433 *** 0.119 -0.380 **
(0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.078) (0.176)
Relative Returns -0.459 * -0.422 -0.682 -0.381 0.166 0.510 *
(0.264) (0.303) (0.456) (0.298) (0.257) (0.295)
Country Crisis -0.537 *** -1.175 * -1.923 *
(0.172) (0.670) (1.057)
Global Crisis -0.028 -0.039 0.371 *
(0.047) (0.138) (0.186)
Country of Origin Returns 0.261 0.991 -0.362
(0.520) (0.949) (0.930)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No No No
Number of Observations 2,857 2,857 2,857 2,745 333 117
R-squared 0.437 0.510 0.532 0.507 0.528 0.660






Behavior of Log Cash Weights
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of the log cash weights on different variables. Panel A presents the results
for equity funds and Panel B for bond funds. The "relative returns" variable is the difference between country net returns and fund net
returns. The "country crisis" variable is a  dummy that indicates if a country has a banking, debt, or currency crisis during a given year. The
dummy is weighted by the relative contribution of the country in the portfolio of a fund.  The "global crisis" variable is a dummy that
indicates periods of worldwide crisis (Jul. 1997-Dec. 1997, Aug. 1998-Dec. 1998, Mar. 2001-Dec. 2001, and Sept. 2008-Jun. 2009). "Country of
origin returns" are the returns from the indexes of the country where the fund is based. Both "relative returns" and "country of origin returns"
are expressed as decimals. Estimations are performed at different frequencies and include different combinations of fixed effects. Errors are









Growth Rate of 
Weights
Growth Rate of Fund 
Assets
Growth Rate of 
Weights
Growth Rate of Fund 
Assets
All Countries 46.5% 53.5% 59.0% 41.0%
Asia 40.5% 59.5% 55.9% 44.1%
Developed Countries 37.5% 62.5% 46.8% 53.2%
Non-emerging Developing Countries 64.3% 35.7% 78.8% 21.2%
Eastern Europe 47.7% 52.3% 65.5% 34.5%
Emerging Countries 36.1% 63.9% 49.8% 50.2%
Latin America 44.2% 55.8% 56.3% 43.7%
Target Region
Return-Adjusted 




Growth Rate of 
Weights 
Injections
All Countries 88.4% 11.6% 84.8% 15.2%
Asia 91.6% 8.4% 84.6% 15.4%
Developed Countries 93.9% 6.1% 87.2% 12.8%
Non-emerging Developing Countries 89.9% 10.1% 91.3% 8.7%
Eastern Europe 85.0% 15.0% 86.3% 13.7%
Emerging Countries 79.9% 20.1% 74.2% 25.8%
Latin America 74.8% 25.2% 75.3% 24.7%
B. Net Flows Adjusting Weights for Returns
Shares 
(% of Net Flows)
Variance Decomposition                  
(% of Variance of Net Flows)
Table 8
Decomposition of Gross and Net Flows by Regions
This table presents the decomposition of gross and net flows into the growth rate of country weights and the growth rate of total mutual
fund assets or injections for different regions. Panel A presents the decomposition for gross flows without adjusting weights for returns,
while Panel B presents the decomposition for net flows adjusting for returns. Shares are calculated as the median share of individual
components for each country, averaged across time, and then averaged across all countries in each region. The variance decomposition is
obtained by taking the variance of each individual component at the country level, and then averaging it across countries. Both gross and
net flows are computed as the sum of the two terms in the decompositions. Since the two terms are not orthogonal, the covariance term is
imputed equally to each component. Outliers are filtered by the share of the component associated with weights in each decomposition.
Only observations within the 10th and 90th percentile of the share of this component are considered.
A. Gross Flows without Adjusting Weights for Returns
Shares 
(% of Gross Flows)
Variance Decomposition
(% of Variance of Gross Flows)
65Type
Growth Rate of 
Weights
Growth Rate of Fund 
Assets
Growth Rate of 
Weights
Growth Rate of Fund 
Assets
Active 49.3% 50.7% 57.9% 42.1%
Passive 21.7% 78.3% 32.0% 68.0%
Equity 47.5% 52.5% 54.6% 45.4%
Bond 66.6% 33.4% 82.2% 17.8%
Frequency
Monthly 46.5% 53.5% 59.0% 41.0%
Semi-Annual 33.7% 66.3% 40.7% 59.3%
Annual 26.2% 73.8% 35.2% 64.8%
Type
Return-Adjusted 




Growth Rate of 
Weights 
Injections
Active 87.4% 12.6% 86.8% 13.2%
Passive 15.0% 85.0% 30.9% 69.1%
Equity 85.9% 14.1% 85.6% 14.4%
Bond 73.8% 26.2% 89.0% 11.0%
Frequency
Monthly 88.4% 11.6% 84.8% 15.2%
Semi-Annual 83.3% 16.7% 78.9% 21.1%
Annual 80.6% 19.4% 73.0% 27.0%
B. Net Flows Adjusting Weights for Returns
Shares 
(% of Net Flows)
Variance Decomposition                      
(% of Variance of Net Flows)
Table 9
Decomposition of Gross and Net Flows by Type and Frequency
This table presents the decomposition of gross and net flows into the growth rate of country weights and the growth rate of
mutual fund assets or injections for different breakdowns. Panel A presents the decomposition for gross flows without
adjusting weights for returns, while Panel B presents the decomposition for net flows adjusting for returns. Shares are
calculated as the median share of individual components for each country, averaged across time, and then averaged across all
countries in each region. The variance decomposition is obtained by taking the variance of each individual component at the
country level, and then averaging it across countries. Both gross and net flows are computed as the sum of the two terms in the
decompositions. Since the two terms are not orthogonal, the covariance term is imputed equally to each component. Outliers
are filtered by the share of the component associated with weights in each decomposition. Only observations within the 10th
and 90th percentile of the share of this component are considered.
A. Gross Flows without Adjusting Weights for Returns
Shares 
(% of Gross Flows)
Variance Decomposition
(% of Variance of Gross Flows)
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Appendix 1: Where Do Mutual Funds Invest? 
Mutual funds specialize along several dimensions. The most important are geographical 
regions, market segments (e.g. emerging and developed), and types of assets (equity and 
bonds). The specialization of funds largely determines the broad patterns of their asset 
allocation, as shown in Appendix Table 2. The table displays the mean portfolio weight 
invested in a geographical/market segment region by different types of equity and bond 
funds, along the number of funds included in each category. The regional classification 
corresponds to that used by EPFR Global (Appendix Table 3). The mean portfolio 
weights reported in the table correspond to the average across funds of the mean 
regional weight of all funds within a category.  
Not surprisingly, funds invest mainly in the region/market segment they target. 
For instance, “Asia ex-Japan” equity funds invest 96% of their portfolio in developed 
and emerging Asia. Similarly, Latin America equity funds invest 97% of their portfolio 
in Latin America. Nonetheless, most fund types invest around 5% of their assets outside 
their target region/segment and in cash. Cash holdings are a small but non-trivial part 
of fund portfolios. The holding of liquid assets may be due to the need to meet 
redemptions or to keep injections until they are properly allocated. Some funds might 
also hold liquidity to be able to invest quickly if opportunities arise (cash-in-the-
market). Perhaps consistently with this latter possibility, active equity and bond funds 
hold much more cash than their passive counterparts. Active equity (bond) funds hold 68 
 
3.4% (5.7%) of assets in cash on average, while passive equity (bond) funds hold only 
0.5% (2%). 
Funds specialized in multi-regional market segments show some interesting 
patters of asset allocation. For instance, global emerging market funds invest mainly in 
emerging Asia, followed by Latina America, emerging Europe, and emerging Middle-
East and Africa. Global equity funds invest mainly in developed Europe, North 
America, and developed Asia, but within emerging markets follow a similar relative 
pattern as global emerging market funds. These rankings suggest that funds invest 
across regions in a manner that is roughly consistent with each region’s market size. 
These patterns are also observed across the countries included in a region. For instance, 
Latin America equity funds invest most of their assets in Brazil, emerging Europe funds 
in Russia, and Asia ex-Japan funds in China and India (Appendix Table 4). 
Bond funds and comparable equity funds allocate their portfolios across regions 
in roughly the same manner. The main difference is that while emerging Asia is the 
principal investment destiny of emerging equity funds, emerging bond funds invest 
primarily in Latin America, followed by emerging Europe, and with emerging Asia in a 
far third place. This probably reflects the relative size and development of Latin 
American sovereign bond markets relative to Asian bond markets, which are, in relative 
terms, much more largely concentrated on corporate bonds. Bond funds also hold more 
cash on average than equity funds (8.55% of the portfolio for global bond funds 
compared to 2.87% of the portfolio for global equity funds). 69 
 
Although mutual funds invest in regions, countries, and segments in a manner 
that is consistent with their specialization, the total net assets (TNAs) they hold in 
target countries experience important variations that roughly coincide with the cycles of 
international capital flows. Appendix Figure 1 plots the evolution of the median growth 
rate of total assets held by equity funds (Panel A) and bond funds (Panel B) in a 
typical country.
34 It shows periods of expansion that coincide with tranquil times for the 
global economy, followed by contractions that roughly match periods of global turmoil. 
For instance, Panel A shows a clear expansion at the beginning of the sample period 
(1996) until the beginning of the Asian crisis, followed by a short-lived expansion that 
collapses during the Russian crisis. It similarly shows the expansion following the 2001 
crisis that lasts until the beginning of the global financial crisis. The pattern of asset 
evolution for bond funds, reported for the shorter period for which bond fund data are 
available, displays an analogous picture. At the regional level, there is more variation in 
the growth rate of fund assets on the median country (unreported), but the overall 
pattern of expansions and contractions coinciding with regional crises persists. 
Overall, the basic statistics reported in this appendix indicate that the mutual 
funds in our sample allocate funds across countries and regions in a manner that is 
consistent with their specialization, and also change their total holdings in different 
countries in a way that follows periods of global expansions and contractions. These 
                                                            
34 Growth rates are computed considering only continuing funds (those present both at t and t-1) and as a 
share of the average assets between in t and t-1. Then, the median country is obtained considering the 
median of growth rates in different countries at a certain point in time. 70 
 
findings provide support for the use of EPFR Global funds to understand the behavior 
of global investors.  
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Appendix 2: How Much Do Country Weights Vary? 
To better understand the variation in country weights in fund portfolios, we compute 
coefficients of variation (CVs) of different types of funds. These CVs correspond to the 
standard deviation of country weights across funds and within funds (over time) relative 
in both cases to the corresponding average weight across funds. We normalize the 
across-fund and within-fund standard deviations by the same mean value for ease of 
comparison. Appendix Table 5 shows the CVs for the funds’ weights across countries 
within the target region, in both the target and non-target regions, and in cash. It does 
so for funds investing in different geographical areas and market segments. The 
classification of target regions is shown in Appendix Table 6 and is taken from MSCI. 
We compute the target region as the sum of country weights belonging to the target 
region for each type of fund. The non-target region is calculated as 100 minus cash and 
target-region weights. The table also shows the CV within the target region, where the 
CV is computed first in a country and then aggregated across countries in the target 
region, with the median CV across funds being reported.  
Appendix Table 5 shows the result of this exercise. When one focuses on 
individual countries within that target region (Column (2)) mutual funds show 
substantial variation in their investments, however, there is little variation when the 
target region is aggregated (Column (3)). When focusing at the country level, the CVs 
in are in various cases larger than one, which means that, for a given country in the 
region, the standard deviation of country weights across funds is larger than the 72 
 
corresponding average weight. Within the target region, different funds follow different 
investment strategies. Not surprisingly, mutual funds have a much more volatile 
allocation in the non-target region compared to their target countries (Column (4)). 
Their cash allocation also suffers important variations relative to their average cash 
weight (Column (5)). 
Appendix Table 5 shows, moreover, that the variation within funds is smaller 
than across funds, suggesting that different strategic allocations are behind differences in 
weights across funds. However, fund allocations to countries within the relevant regions 
vary substantially over time (Column (2)). The within-fund CVs are again about half of 
the across-fund CVs, but of the same order of magnitude than the average weights in 
each country. This indicates substantial within-fund variation in country allocations. 
Understandably, the variation in country weights is larger than that of the main target 
region. Namely, Asia funds switch among countries in Asia more than what they switch 
in and out of Asia, since they have to be invested in that region.  
Appendix Table 7 shows similar estimates of the CVs, but partitioning the 
sample by active and passive funds and looking at different geographical regions. The 
table shows that the CVs are larger for active funds than for passive funds when 
considering the within-fund variation. That is, managers of active funds seem to be 
more active than those of passive funds. This pattern does not hold for the CVs across 
funds, denoting similar differences in strategic allocation across passive and active funds, 
due for instance to the tracking of different benchmarks. In sum, the CVs show that 73 
 
weights vary as expected but also that there is substantial variation in weights, that is, 
weights do not remain constant across countries and regions, across and within funds. 
Of course, these results do not explain what drives the changes in weights; in particular, 
to what extent this variation is driven by prices. While prices will tend to affect 
weights, they cannot be the sole source of variation since active funds display larger 
CVs than passive ones.  
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Appendix 3: Partial Adjustment Model 
The parameter estimates of Equation (5) can be interpreted in light of a basic partial 
adjustment model. Starting with the identity in Equation (4) and transforming it into 
an estimable equation requires an expression for the relative flows. Intuitively, relative 
flows depend on the portfolio weight a fund wants to have in a given country at a point 
in time and its current portfolio weight on that country. If the former is greater than 
the latter, the fund will try to move relatively more money into the country and vice 
versa. This intuition can be captured by a simple partial adjustment model, 
                       
                ,  (A1) 
where     
   is the log desired weight in the country and                                is the 
log buy-and-hold weight that fund   faces before any flows or injections are realized. The 
parameter   captures the fund’s speed of adjustment towards its desired weight. A value 
of   equal to one implies that the fund immediately adjusts its weights to its desired 
level through movements in relative flows, and a value smaller than one means that 
adjustment costs preclude a fund from immediately reaching its target. 
This simple description of flows is completely agnostic about the desired portfolio 
weight      
  , which is likely the outcome of a fund’s optimal portfolio allocation. 
However, one can parametrically relate these desired weights to country and fund 
characteristics. In particular, we consider the following equation for log desired weights 
    
                                                 .  (A2) 75 
 
Although admittedly arbitrary, this specification is also very flexible and embeds several 
alternative forms for the desired weights. For instance, if  ,  , and   are all equal to 
zero, and      is different from zero, it implies that a fund’s desired country weights are 
roughly constant. On the other hand, if   is different from zero, it means that the 
desired weight responds to changes in relative returns. The      variables allow us to test 
for the impact of crises on desired weights. 
Replacing Equation (A2) in Equation (A1) we obtain an expression that is 
analogous to Equation (5) above. Thus, Equation (5) may be interpreted as a reduced 
form representation of this partial adjustment model. Analogously, replacing Equations 
(A1) and (A2) in Equation (4) we obtain the following estimable equation 
        1 λ 1               1     1                   
                                           ,  
(A3) 
After grouping parameters, Equation (A3) is analogous to Equation (6). This 
representation makes apparent that the coefficients on lagged weights     and relative 
returns     embed both the pure buy-and-hold effect (captured by the 1 embedded in 
the coefficients) and the response of relative flows to these variables due to adjustment 
costs (the speed of adjustment  ) and the sensitivity of desired weights to lagged 
weights and relative returns (  and  ).  
Under some identification assumptions, the simple framework described above 
allows us to use the parameters estimated from Equation (6) to learn about the 
determinants of the behavior of portfolio managers. The presence of lagged weights in 
Equation (A2) captures the persistence of some determinants of desired weights that are 76 
 
not captured by the rest of the model. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that   0 .  
If one assumes that   0 ,  the coefficient on log lagged weights provides direct 
information on the speed of adjustment. The smaller the coefficient  , the larger is the 
implied   and the smaller the adjustment costs (a lower   is associated with greater 
adjustment costs). Similarly, finding a coefficient on relative returns,  , different from 
one does not provide immediate evidence that portfolio managers adjust their desired 
weights     
   in response to returns, because it may just come from the presence of costs 
of adjusting portfolio weights (  1    when   0 ).  
Under the mild assumption that   0 ,  what really provides information about 
the relation between returns and desired weights is the difference between the 
coefficients estimated for relative returns and log lagged weights, which corresponds to 
        . In this case, a coefficient on relative returns larger than the coefficient for 
lagged weights means that   is also positive and that desired weights and, hence, 
relative flows, increase with relative returns (inducing a momentum component in the 
behavior of relative flows).  
The results described above for the preferred specifications including fund-time 
and country of destiny-fund fixed effects yield coefficients for relative returns that are 
larger than those for lagged weights (Table 5, Columns 5 and 6). This suggests that 
desired portfolio weights are positively correlated with a country’s relative return. 
Namely, funds would like to reduce their portfolio weights in a country with negative 
relative returns. However, to the extent that the impact of relative returns on desired 77 
 
weights is less than one-to-one (  1  in Equation (A2)), the pass through from relative 
returns to buy-and-hold weights (      ) dominates and the fund increases its relative 
flows to that country. Intuitively, what is going on is that desired weights are declining 
less than the direct decline resulting from relative returns. This may paradoxically result 
in relative flows that are negatively associated with relative returns. 
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Appendix 4: Two Other Decompositions of Gross and Net Flows 
To obtain other decompositions of gross and net flows, we start with Equation (7) for 
gross flows:         ∑                  ∑               . Note that the first term may grow because of 
increases in country returns, since a country weight can also be expressed as       
      
           
          . Whether one should attribute that increase to a manager decision is 
open to debate and depends on what “passive benchmark” one has in mind (the 
counterfactual weight under a “passive” strategy). Attributing the whole growth in 
weights to managers is akin to having the past period’s weight as the passive 
benchmark. One way of tackling this issue, which is equivalent to considering a different 
benchmark, is to re-arrange Equation (7) in a way that removes changes in relative 
returns from the first term, 
        ∑                                    ∑                                ,   
        ∑                                    ∑                      ,  (A4) 
where the second step uses the fact that                  . In this decomposition, the first 
component corresponds to the growth in weights that is not related to returns and 
depends only on relative flows from fund   to country  ,            . This way of measuring 
the contribution of managers implicitly assumes a buy-and-hold strategy as the passive 
benchmark and only considers deviations from buy-and-hold weights as the 
responsibility of the managers. The second component has no clear economic 
interpretation and embeds the other two forces that drive the growth in total assets: 
injections and the return of the country. 79 
 
From Equation (8), net flows to a country (growth in total assets net of returns) 
can be similarly decomposed as follows to isolate the contribution of total changes in 
weights: 
       ∑                  ∑                               . (A5) 
The first term in Equation (A5) allows us to separate the contribution of the total 
growth in weights to net flows, but in this case the second term embeds the contribution 
of injections net of relative returns.  
Results using Equation (A4) are displayed in Appendix Table 9, Panel A. The 
results suggest that the growth rate of weights net of returns explains a smaller share of 
both the level and variance of the growth rate of assets (22% and 32% respectively) 
when compared to the growth rate of weights reported in Table 8, Panel A. This 
pattern suggests that the trend of gross flows is slightly dominated by the growth of 
fund assets, but that most fluctuations around that trend come from the growth in 
weights. The only exception is non-emerging developing countries, where the growth in 
weights also explains a large share of the growth in gross assets. This indicates that 
these countries have benefited from net reallocation vis-à-vis other regions. 
Appendix Table 9, Panel B shows the results for the decomposition of Equation 
(A5). In this case, the growth of weights explains on average 78% of the level of net 
flows and 77% of their variance. A comparison with the results in Table 8, Panel B 
shows that the role of manager behavior is larger when it is associated with changes in 
weights adjusted by relative returns (equivalent to relative flows) than when considering 
the total growth of weights. Net flows are more closely associated, at least on a monthly 80 
 
frequency, with relative flows allocated by managers across countries than with 
movements in returns. Appendix Figure 1
Growth Rate of Total Assets for the Median Country
This figure presents the growth rate of the total amount of assets for the median country for equity
and bond funds in Panels A and B. Growth rates are obtained as a share of the average amount of
assets between t and t-1, considering only funds available both at t and t-1. The median country is
obtained using the median of the growth rates for different countries in each month. Shaded areas















Mean Median Std. Deviation
Equity Funds 0.11% 0.76% 6.15%
Bond Funds 0.82% 1.05% 3.82%

















































































Aberdeen Asset Management 48 Charlemagne Capital Limited 8 ING Investment Management 5 RBC Global Investment Management 3
ABN AMRO Asset Management 8 Clariden Leu 5 Institutional Capital LLC 2 RCM Capital Management 8
Absolute Asia Asset Management 2 Claymore Advisors 2 Invesco Asset Management 46 Rexiter Capital Management 2
Activest 3 Comgest S.A. 16 Investec Asset Management 2 Robeco Asset Management 3
AGF International Advisors 4 Credit Lyonnais International Asset Management 4 ISI - Sydinvest International 6 Schroder Investment Management 40
AIB Govett Asset Management 2 Credit Suisse Asset Management 16 JO Hambro Capital Management 6 Scottish Widows Investment Partnership 3
Algebra Capital 2 Daiwa International Capital Management 2 JPMorgan Asset Management 63 Securities & Inv. Company (SICO) 2
AllianceBernstein Capital Management 3 Deutsche Asset Management 37 Jyske Invest 7 SG Asset Management 2
Allianz Dresdner Asset Management 5 Dexia Asset Management 2 Lazard Asset Management 3 Silk Invest 2
Allianz Global Investors 14 Edinburgh Fund Managers 2 Legg Mason Capital Management 3 Societe Generale Asset Management 8
Amundi Luxembourg SA 5 ERSTE-Sparinvest 2 Lloyd George Management 5 Standard Americas 5
Arisaig Partners 2 Federated Global Investment Management 4 Lombard Odier International Portfolio Advisors 2 State Street Global Advisors 18
Artisan Partners 5 Fidelity Management & Research 9 M&G Investment Management 5 Swisscanto Asset Management 2
Ashmore Inv. Management 13 First State Investments 12 Martin Currie Investment Management 9 T Rowe Price Associates 4
Assenagon Asset Management 3 Foreign & Colonial Emerging Markets 6 Matthews International Capital Management 2 TCW Investment Management 3
Aviva Investors 8 Franklin Templeton Investment Management 35 Mondrian Inv. Partners Limited 2 Thames River Capital 5
AXA Framlington Investment Management 5 Gartmore Investment Limited 29 Morgan Stanley Investment Management 32 Threadneedle Investment Management 15
AXA Inv. Managers 5 Genesis Investment Management 5 Natixis Asset Management 3 Trident Investment Management 2
Baillie Gifford 13 Glitnir Asset Management 5 Nevksy Capital LLP 4 UBS Global Asset Management 16
BankInvest 8 Global Asset Management 7 Nicholas-Applegate Capital Management 2 Union Investment GmbH 6
Baring Asset Management 12 Goldman Sachs Asset Management 4 Nordea Investment Management 2 Van Eck Global Asset Management 4
Batterymarch Financial Management 18 Goodman & Company, Investment Counsel 4 Pictet Asset Management 13 Vanguard Group 2
BCV Asset Management 6 Grantham, Mayo, van Otterloo (GMO) 8 PIMCO 4 Vontobel Asset Management 3
BlackRock Investment Management 55 Griffin Capital Management 2 PineBridge Investments LLC 16 Wells Capital Management 2
BNP Paribas Inv. Partners 27 Halbis Capital Management 11 Pioneer Investment Management 3 WestLB Asset Management 8
Brandywine Asset Management 2 Hansberger Global Investors 3 PowerShares Capital Management 5 William Blair & Co. 7
Capital Invest KAG 2 Henderson Global Investors 11 Putnam Investment Management 10 WisdomTree Asset Mgt./BNY Investment Advisors 2
Capital Research & Management 11 HSBC Asset Management 10 Raiffeisen Capital Management 2 Other Asset Management Companies 83
Total Number of Funds: 1,076
Appendix Table 1
Number of Funds by Asset Management Companies











Middle East and 
Africa
North America Other Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Asia Ex-Japan 201 32.83 0.04 63.20 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 3.89
BRIC 18 0.97 0.01 46.46 16.84 32.58 0.00 0.00 0.91 2.22
Emerg. Europe, Middle East, and Africa 38 0.07 1.10 0.00 14.12 0.00 77.44 0.00 0.19 7.09
Emerging Europe 91 0.06 4.08 0.41 91.17 0.15 0.43 0.00 0.06 3.62
Europe 143 0.14 97.16 0.07 0.34 0.08 0.26 0.05 0.04 1.85
Global 155 16.59 41.52 5.03 0.64 2.29 1.28 28.57 1.20 2.87
Global Emerging 187 2.54 1.05 46.01 12.03 22.87 10.97 0.01 1.20 3.32
Latin America 91 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 97.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 2.88
Pacific 41 66.79 0.13 29.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 3.04
Investor Type
Active 917 12.89 21.09 25.46 12.01 14.72 5.33 4.60 0.50 3.40











Middle East and 
Africa
North America Other Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Global 81 10.62 35.72 3.78 2.42 4.21 0.90 29.74 3.44 8.55
Global Emerging 30 0.83 0.30 13.62 27.78 43.42 7.32 0.05 2.23 4.45
Investor Type
Active 108 3.57 10.14 10.74 20.62 32.67 5.49 8.29 2.63 5.66





Weights in Mutual Funds by Geographical Regions
Panel A reports the average weights invested by equity funds in each of the geographical regions reported in the columns and cash. Panel B reports the average weights invested by bond funds. Columns (2)-(10)
are obtained by calculating the average weights within funds over time, and then obtaining the mean across funds. Funds are divided according to their target region. The geographical region with the largest

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Australia Austria Cambodia Albania Argentina Canada Algeria Other Fixed Income
Hong Kong Belgium China Baltic Republics Bolivia U.S. Bahrain Other Equity
Japan Denmark India Belarus Brazil Bangladesh
New Zealand Finland Indonesia Chile Botswana
France Korea (North) Colombia Congo-Kinshasa
Germany Korea (South) Bulgaria Costa Rica Egypt
Singapore Greece Malaysia Croatia Cuba Gabon
Iceland Mongolia Cyprus Ghana
Ireland Other Asia Czech Republic Iran
Italy Pakistan Estonia Ecuador Iraq
Netherlands Philippines Georgia El Salvador Israel
Norway Sri Lanka Hungary Guatemala Ivory Coast
Other Europe Taiwan Kazakhstan Jamaica Jordan
Portugal Thailand Latvia Mexico Kenya
Spain Turkmenistan Lithuania Nicaragua Kuwait
Sweden Vietnam Macedonia Lebanon
Switzerland Moldova Libya




















This table presents the regional classification of countries provided by EPFR Global. Note that the weights for some of these countries may
be always zero. Column (8) represents investments in other countries not covered by EPFR Global in both equity and bond funds.
Papua New
   Guinea
Bosnia and
   Herzegovina
United Arab 
   Emirates
Serbia and 
   Montenegro
Trinidad and 
   Tobago
Other 
   Latin America
Dominican 
   Republic
Other Middle East 
   and Africa
84Number of 
Funds
Brazil China Germany India Japan Russia U.K. U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Asia Ex-Japan 201 0.00 11.16 0.00 5.22 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00
BRIC 18 32.70 31.42 0.00 15.07 0.00 16.84 0.00 0.00
Emerg. Europe, Middle East, and Africa 38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.35 0.21 0.00
Emerging Europe 91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 46.14 0.00 0.01
Europe 143 0.00 0.02 17.73 0.08 0.00 0.14 15.11 0.06
Global 155 1.44 1.57 5.76 0.63 11.89 0.38 13.60 24.14
Global Emerging 187 13.04 8.42 0.00 6.94 0.00 5.77 0.06 0.00
Latin America 91 45.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Pacific 41 0.00 8.10 0.00 2.92 35.04 0.00 0.21 0.00
Investor Type
Active 917 7.75 4.83 3.27 2.83 3.46 5.19 4.32 4.27
Passive 48 9.23 8.08 6.55 2.85 5.15 7.09 6.15 4.16
Number of 
Funds
Brazil China Germany India Japan Russia U.K. U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Global 81 13.44 0.43 0.00 0.58 0.00 8.40 0.00 0.03
Global Emerging 30 1.16 0.00 8.48 0.06 11.11 1.18 9.43 24.76
Investor Type
Active 108 10.53 0.38 2.48 0.39 2.33 7.58 2.11 7.79





Country Weights in Mutual Funds (Country Examples)
Panel A reports the average weights of individual equity funds in each of the countries reported in the columns. Panel B reports the average
weights of individual bond funds. Columns (2)-(9) are obtained by calculating the average weights within funds, and then obtaining the mean










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Across Funds 0.83 0.11 1.82 1.27
Within Funds 0.44 0.05 0.45 1.03
Across Funds 0.24 0.05 1.97 0.93
Within Funds 0.10 0.02 0.54 0.72
Across Funds 2.05 0.74 0.48 0.84
Within Funds 0.37 0.13 0.13 0.76
Across Funds 0.54 0.13 0.99 1.23
Within Funds 0.37 0.07 0.49 0.99
Across Funds 1.10 0.04 1.31 1.05
Within Funds 0.55 0.03 0.60 1.06
Across Funds 1.57 0.07 0.66 1.15
Within Funds 0.61 0.05 0.41 0.72
Across Funds 0.66 0.04 1.56 0.85
Within Funds 0.53 0.03 0.68 0.93
Across Funds 0.62 0.04 1.08 0.89
Within Funds 0.49 0.04 0.73 1.12
Across Funds 0.89 0.07 0.94 0.90
Within Funds 0.39 0.04 0.44 0.78
Bond Funds
Across Funds 2.09 0.19 0.56 1.22
Within Funds 0.66 0.08 0.22 0.46
Across Funds 1.23 0.14 1.35 1.78














Coefficients of Variation in Mutual Funds
This table reports the coefficients of variation (CVs) in the target region, non-target region, and cash by funds
investing in different areas of the world. The target region is the sum of country weights of countries that belong to
that region in each fund type. The non-target region is 100, minus cash, minus the target region. Column (2)
reports the CVs within the target region. The CVs within the target region are first calculated for each country, and
then the median across countries is calculated for the target region. The means for the CVs in Columns (3)-(5) are
obtained by calculating means of weights within funds, and then obtaining the average across funds. To calculate
the coefficients across funds, the standard deviation is calculated across funds after obtaining the mean within
funds. For the within funds coefficients, the standard deviation and the CVs are calculated within funds, and then








Middle East, and 
Africa
Emerging Europe Europe Global Global Emerging Latin America Pacific
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
China Brazil Czech Republic Czech Republic Austria Argentina Argentina Argentina Australia
Hong Kong China Egypt Hungary Belgium Australia Brazil Brazil China
India India Hungary Poland Czech Republic Austria Chile Chile Hong Kong
Indonesia Russia Morocco Russia Denmark Belgium China Colombia Indonesia
Korea (South) Poland Turkey Finland Brazil Colombia Mexico Japan
Malaysia Russia France Canada Czech Republic Peru Korea
Philippines South Africa Germany Chile Egypt Malaysia
Singapore Turkey Greece China Hungary New Zealand
Taiwan Hungary Colombia India Philippines
Thailand Ireland Czech Republic Indonesia Singapore
Italy Denmark Korea Taiwan





Spain Hong Kong Poland
Sweden Hungary Russia




























  Relevant Region Classification 
Appendix Table 6
















Across Funds 1.46 1.65 1.10 2.23 1.94 2.92 2.87 2.94 1.12
Within Funds 0.20 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.94 0.93
Across Funds 2.05 1.27 1.51 2.51 1.99 3.02 3.16 3.68 2.96
Within Funds 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.73 0.89
Across Funds 2.00 1.82 0.77 0.62 0.63 0.99 2.00 1.16 1.58
Within Funds 0.31 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.14 0.37 0.22 0.79 0.91
Across Funds - - 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.06 1.73 - 1.04
Within Funds - - 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.00 - 0.47
Appendix Table 7
Coefficients of Variation in Mutual Funds by Investment Strategy
This table reports the coefficients of variation (CVs) by type of fund in each geographical region and cash. All the CVs are computed with the same mean. This mean is calculated first
within funds, and then across funds. The CVs across funds are obtained by first calculating the standard deviation within funds and then across funds. The CVs within funds are obtained












88Log Lagged Weights -0.014 *** -0.018 *** -0.017 *** -0.101 *** -0.099 *** -0.099 *** -0.432 *** -0.693 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.026)
Relative Returns -0.378 *** -0.353 *** -0.007 -0.402 *** -0.041 *** -0.044 *** -0.143 *** -0.433 ***
(0.051) (0.057) (0.013) (0.049) (0.013) (0.013) (0.032) (0.035)
Country Crisis -0.02 *** -0.069 *** -0.118 ***
(0.003) (0.017) (0.026)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Fund-Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Destiny-Fund Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 458,458 458,458 458,458 458,458 458,458 458,458 62,949 26,018
R-squared 0.018 0.023 0.120 0.079 0.174 0.174 0.384 0.545
Variables
Log Lagged Weights -0.026 *** -0.031 *** -0.030 *** -0.132 *** -0.134 *** -0.134 *** -0.552 *** -0.898 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.037) (0.059)
Relative Returns -0.763 *** -0.762 *** -0.362 *** -0.781 *** -0.392 *** -0.389 *** -0.704 *** -0.69 ***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.079) (0.084) (0.073) (0.073) (0.101) (0.100)
Country Crisis -0.016 -0.017 -0.026
(0.011) (0.050) (0.084)
Fund Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Time Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
Fund-Time Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Destiny-Fund Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 39,183 39,183 39,183 39,183 39,183 39,183 5,035 1,959
R-squared 0.028 0.036 0.123 0.109 0.198 0.198 0.495 0.700
Appendix Table 8
Behavior of Relative Flows
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions of the difference of log country weights and log buy-and-hold weights on different variables.
Panel A presents the results for equity funds and Panel B for bond funds. The "country crisis" variable is a dummy that indicates if a country has a banking, debt,
or currency crisis during a given year. The "relative returns" variable is the difference between country net returns and fund net returns, expressed as decimals.
Estimations are performed at different frequencies and include different combinations of fixed effects. Only countries in the target region are considered for each
type of fund. Errors are clustered by country of origin-time. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. 
A. Equity Funds
Variables
Log Country Weights Minus Log Buy-and-Hold Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Monthly Semi-Annual Annual
Monthly Semi Annual Annual
B. Bond Funds
Log Country Weights Minus Log Buy-and-Hold Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
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Return-Adjusted 




Growth Rate of 
Weights 
Other
All Countries 22.4% 77.6% 32.1% 67.9%
Asia -1.4% 101.4% 5.7% 94.3%
Developed Countries 18.5% 81.5% 27.4% 72.6%
Non-emerging Developing Countries 46.5% 53.5% 61.4% 38.6%
Eastern Europe 29.6% 70.4% 43.6% 56.4%
Emerging Countries -1.8% 101.8% 2.6% 97.4%
Latin America 21.0% 79.0% 32.4% 67.6%
Region
Growth Rate of 
Weights
Other
Growth Rate of 
Weights
Other
All Countries 78.0% 22.0% 77.4% 22.6%
Asia 76.7% 23.3% 66.1% 33.9%
Developed Countries 80.8% 19.2% 83.0% 17.0%
Non-emerging Developing Countries 78.6% 21.4% 80.7% 19.3%
Eastern Europe 73.5% 26.5% 71.8% 28.2%
Emerging Countries 74.0% 26.0% 66.9% 33.1%
Latin America 71.8% 28.2% 75.2% 24.8%
B. Net Flows without Adjusting Weights for Returns
Shares 
(% of Net Flows)
Variance Decomposition                 
(% of Variance of Net Flows)
Appendix Table 9
Decomposition of Gross and Net Flows by Regions
This table presents the decomposition of gross and net flows into the growth rate of country weights and other terms for different
regions. Panel A presents the decomposition of gross flows adjusting the weights for returns, while Panel B presents the decomposition
of net flows without adjusting for returns. Shares are calculated as the median share of individual components for each country,
averaged across time, and then averaged across all countries in each region. The variance decomposition is obtained by taking the
variance of each individual component at the country level, and then averaging it across countries. Both gross and net flows are
computed as the sum of the two terms in the decompositions. Since the two terms are not orthogonal, the covariance term is imputed
equally to each component. Outliers are filtered by the share of the component associated with weights in each decomposition. Only
observations within the 10th and 90th percentile of the share of this component are considered.
A. Gross Flows Adjusting Weights for Returns
Shares 
(% of Gross Flows)
Variance Decomposition                 
(% of Variance of Gross Flows)
90